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A “MORE SEARCHING JUDICIAL 
INQUIRY”: THE JUSTICIABILITY OF 
INTRA-MILITARY SEXUAL  
ASSAULT CLAIMS 
Abstract: More than seventy members of the U.S. military face abusive sexual 
contact, aggravated sexual assault, or rape every day, equating to three victims 
every hour. Congress and the Department of Defense have proposed reforms that 
focus on changes to the criminal justice system under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) in addition to tactical safety and informational efforts for 
prevention and response. Although deterrent measures and a transparent criminal 
justice system are both necessary components for meaningful reform, this Note 
argues that lasting institutional change and true individual justice can only be 
achieved by providing a civil remedy. To date, Article III courts deny military 
personnel civil remedies against both their perpetrators and the institutions 
charged with protecting military service members. This Note argues for the U.S. 
Supreme Court to overturn its 1950 decision in Feres v. United States to comport 
with the text and legislative intent of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and calls upon 
the Court to recognize its role in protecting a discrete and insular minority—
military victims of sexual assault—suffering from the traumatic personal and 
professional effects of a system that provides no civil redress. 
INTRODUCTION 
In fiscal year 2013, the U.S. military received 5,061 reports of sexual as-
sault or “unwanted sexual contact.”1 This number represents a fifty percent 
increase in complaints from the previous year.2 Moreover, Department of De-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Dep’t of Defense, Annual Report of Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2013, at 2 
(2014). Of the 5,061 reports of sexual assault in Fiscal Year 2013, 4,113 of the victims were service 
members. Id. Additionally, approximately fifty-four percent of the 5,061 reports involved service 
member on service member crime. Id. 
 2 Compare id. (reporting that in Fiscal Year 2013, there were 5,061 reports of sexual assault in-
volving one or more service members), with Dep’t of Defense, Annual Report of Sexual Assault in the 
Military, Fiscal Year 2012, at 3 (2013) (reporting that in Fiscal Year 2012, there were 3,374 reports of 
sexual assault involving service members). Though a vastly underreported crime in both military and 
civilian life, the Pentagon attributed the significant rise in reports within the military not to an increase 
in incidents of unwanted sexual contact, but rather to increased victim willingness to come forward 
and make official complaints. See Chris Good, Military Sex Assault Reports Up 50 Percent This Year, 
ABC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2013, 3:19 PM) http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/12/military-sex-
assault-reports-up-50-percent-this-year/, archived at http://perma.cc/QM9P-BNE7 (reporting that Col. 
Metzler believes the numbers are from increased reporting, not an increased number of sexual as-
 
1330 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1329 
fense officials reported that approximately 26,000 service members experi-
enced some type of unwanted sexual contact or sexual assault in fiscal year 
2012.3 
Despite departmental and legislative efforts to curb these numbers, female 
military service members face a higher risk of sexual assault by a fellow mili-
tary comrade than death by enemy fire.4 Likewise—and not to be over-
looked—men represent the majority of service members who are sexually as-
saulted each year.5 Consequently, war does not cease when these military men 
and women return home.6 Rather, despite their sacrifice for their country, vic-
                                                                                                                           
saults); Jennifer Steinhauer, Reports of Military Sexual Assault Rise Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2013, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/reports-of-military-sexual-assault-
rise-sharply.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6CYY-L93S. In addition to intra-military sexual assault, 
this number includes sexual assaults by civilians on service members and by service members on 
civilians. Steinhauer, supra. As defined in the report, sexual assault includes rape, sodomy and other 
unwanted sexual contact, including touching of private body parts, but does not include sexual har-
assment. See Dep’t of Defense, supra at 2 n.7. 
 3 See Dep’t of Defense, supra note 2, at 4, 71; Chris Carroll, Reports of Sexual Assault in the 
Military Climbed in FY 2013, STARS AND STRIPES, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/us/
reports-of-sexual-assault-in-the-military-climbed-in-fy-2013-1.270162, archived at http://perma.cc/
3TVQ-J544 (reporting that the survey collecting this data indicated that fewer than twenty percent of 
sexual assault incidents are reported). The estimate from Defense Department officials was based on 
an anonymous “prevalence survey” given to troops. Id. The survey is conducted every second year 
and, therefore, no estimate is available for Fiscal Year 2013. Id. 
 4 See Sexual Assault in the Military: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign 
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Jane 
Harman, Cong. Rep.); Megan N. Schmid, Comment, Combating a Different Enemy: Proposals to 
Change the Culture of Sexual Assault in the Military, 55 VILL. L. REV. 475, 475–76 (2010) (noting 
the significant risk of sexual assault for female military members). 
 5 See Moni Basu, Veteran Confronts Rape, Suicide: “I am angry that others are going through 
this,” CNN (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/21/us/military-suicide-rape/index.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YZ76-WJCN; James Dao, In Debate Over Military Sexual Assault, Men 
Are Overlooked Victims, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/24/us/in-debate-over-military-sexual-assault-men-are-overlooked-victims.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RTN7-R8UG; see also JUSTICE DENIED: MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA THE MEN’S 
STORIES (9 Point Productions 2013) (detailing the “super-silent epidemic” of male victims of military 
sexual assault). Of the estimated 26,000 cases of unwanted sexual contact in 2012, the Pentagon re-
ported fifty-three percent involved attacks on men, mostly by other men. See Dao, supra. Although 
women, who represent an estimated fifteen percent of the military force, face a greater probability of 
sexual assault than men, military sexual assault also affects male service members at prevalent rates. 
See id. 
 6 See Francine Banner, Immoral Waiver: Judicial Review of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 
17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 723, 728 (2013) (documenting the struggles military victims face when 
they return home as a result of intra-military sexual assault, including high rates of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, military sexual trauma, other psychological trauma, difficulty accessing treatment and 
services for mental and physical conditions, high rates of divorce, domestic violence rates two to five 
times higher than for private citizens, and even suicide). 
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tims of intra-military sexual assault continue to fight a losing battle for crimi-
nal and civil protections in the American legal system.7 
The enemy in this case is the Feres doctrine, a judicially created excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) barring all military personnel 
claims arising out of injuries incurred incident to service.8 In 1950, in Feres v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FTCA’s broad waiver of 
sovereign immunity did not extend to claims brought by service members 
against the government and its officials.9 This wholesale deference to military 
discipline and decision making by the Court strips military plaintiffs of stand-
ing to hold the military or the government responsible for injuries suffered 
while on active duty.10 
For countless victims of military sexual assault, the Feres doctrine has 
closed the doors of civilian courthouses.11 Efforts to hold government and 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 506, 517–18 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of mili-
tary sexual assault claims against Department of Defense officials); Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 
8, 18–20 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing claims action against Department of Defense officials brought by 
victims of intra-military sexual assault); Banner, supra note 6, at 724–25, 738–40 (describing the legal 
battles facing the plaintiffs in Cioca and Klay, as well as other similar intra-military sexual assault 
claims). 
 8 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); see Banner, supra note 6, at 725 (noting that 
victims of intra-military sexual assault seeking legal recourse in civilian courts face a “Sisyphean 
battle” primarily on account of Feres principles that “bar justiciability of claims by military personnel 
against superior officers not only for negligence and intentional torts, but also for blatant violations of 
constitutional rights”). The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 
(2012), provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for certain tort actions “where the United 
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred.” § 1346(b)(1); see § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, 
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent 
as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .”). 
 9 See 340 U.S. at 142–46. In later decisions, the Court expanded the rationales of Feres, citing the 
need to provide sovereign immunity to avoid infringing on the military’s decision making. See United 
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 680–81 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 687–88, 691–
92 (1987); Banner, supra note 6, at 727 n.20 (arguing that as the Feres doctrine has devolved over 
several decades, courts have focused on the maintenance of military discipline as the primary rationale 
for barring FTCA claims by military personnel); Christopher G. Froelich, Comment, Closing the Eq-
uitable Loophole: Assessing the Supreme Court’s Next Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable 
Relief for Military Plaintiffs, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 699, 713 (2005) (noting the broad sphere of 
sovereign immunity created by Feres, and addressing the criticism in courts and academia of the deci-
sion and its subsequent application in later decisions). 
 10 See David Saul Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of 
the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992, 996–97 (1986) (noting that the Feres doctrine is problematic 
because it bars claims without regard for whether other adequate intra-military remedies exist). 
 11 See Banner, supra note 6, at 725 (arguing that the Feres doctrine is a significant obstacle facing 
victims of intra-military sexual assault seeking a remedy in civilian court); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 
993 (noting that the Feres doctrine forecloses to military plaintiffs the two avenues by which citizens 
can sue the government). In particular, civilians can bring suit against the government (1) under the 
FTCA, which waives the sovereign immunity of the United States; or (2) under a Bivens claim, alleg-
ing an implied remedy under the Constitution for tortious conduct violating constitutional rights. 
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military officials accountable fall on the deaf ears, as courts continue to dis-
miss such claims without considering their merits.12 Sovereign immunity 
trumps individual liability under the Feres doctrine, even in the face of clear 
injustices suffered by military service members.13 
This Note argues that the Feres doctrine should be overturned because it 
does not comport with the text and legislative intent of the FTCA, and because 
principles of judicial review demand that the Supreme Court step in where, as 
here, the rights and legal protections of a discrete and insular minority are at 
risk.14 Part I provides a critical examination of the development and current 
state of the Feres doctrine and the use of sovereign immunity as a basis for 
judicial abstention in intra-military claims.15 Part II discusses the limitations of 
the military justice system and the effect of the Feres doctrine on claims 
against the government and its officials in the context of intra-military sexual 
                                                                                                                           
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 993 n.7; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respect-
ing the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances . . . .”); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391–92, 396 (1971) (allowing claims to be brought directly 
against individual government officials, who are protected by official immunity, but not sovereign 
immunity). 
 12 See, e.g., Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506, 517–18; Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 777–78 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 20. Specifically, the class actions filed against Department of 
Defense officials in Cioca and Klay alleged that the defendants violated the military plaintiffs’ consti-
tutional rights by failing to (1) investigate rapes and sexual assaults; (2) prosecute perpetrators; (3) 
provide an adequate judicial system as required by the Uniform Military Justice Act; and (4) abide by 
congressional deadlines to implement institutional reforms to stop rapes and other sexual assaults. See 
Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 10–11. 
 13 See, e.g., Gonzales v. U.S. Air Force, 88 F. App’x 371, 375–76 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming the 
dismissal of a FTCA claim brought by an active duty female military plaintiff who was raped by a 
fellow service member while sleeping in her barracks); Smith, 196 F.3d at 777–78 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(barring former military service member’s FTCA claim against the government for negligent supervi-
sion of her drill sergeant who committed a series of off-post, off-duty sexual assaults against her); Day 
v. Mass. Air Nat’l Guard, 167 F.3d 678, 680 (1st Cir. 1999) (denying serviceman’s state tort and civil 
rights claims against the United States and individual guardsmen for assault and battery during a 
“despicable” on-base hazing); Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, State-
ment by the Press Secretary on New DOD Initiatives to Eliminate Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces 
(Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/15/statement-
press-secretary-new-dod-initiatives-eliminate-sexual-assault-a, archived at http://perma.cc/B6Q5-
2L2N (reiterating the President’s disapproval with the military leadership’s efforts to combat sexual 
assault, and reporting the need for the Department of Defense, including the senior civilian leadership 
and each of the Services, to fulfill the President’s call to action). Notably, in many decisions denying 
relief to military victims, lower courts have expressed dismay over the Feres doctrine and the inability 
of district and appellate courts to change the doctrine. See, e.g., Day, 167 F.3d at 683 (suggesting that 
Feres may deserve reexamination by the U.S. Supreme Court since the decision’s original reasons are 
no longer persuasive); Smith, 196 F.3d at 778 (finding that the plaintiff’s suit is barred by Feres but 
asserting that this determination in no way suggested the court minimized the seriousness of the al-
leged misconduct). 
 14 See infra notes 143–189 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 20–88 and accompanying text. 
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assault.16 Part III then argues that the judicial doctrine must be re-examined by 
the Supreme Court because judicial review is necessary to protect the rights of 
victimized military personnel, hold the government and military officials ac-
countable, and bring the Court’s construction of the FTCA in line with the text 
and true intent of the enacting Congress.17 Part III proposes that the Court 
abandon the Feres doctrine and reinterpret the FTCA’s combatant activities 
exception narrowly to comport with Congress’s intent and a common sense 
definition of the term combatant.18 Doing so, the Court will avoid further tink-
ering with a doctrine already on unstable ground.19 
I. THE FERES DOCTRINE & INTRA-MILITARY IMMUNITY:  
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Part I of this Note details the history of the Feres doctrine and the trajec-
tory of intra-military immunity in the American legal system, beginning with 
Congress’s enactment of the FTCA in 1946 and proceeding through the Su-
preme Court’s expansion of the sovereign immunity exception in intra-military 
disputes.20 Section A discusses the history and legislative purpose of the 
FTCA.21 Section B then reviews the Court’s 1950 decision in Feres.22 Section 
C analyzes the evolution and expansion of Feres and discusses the current rea-
soning articulated by courts for upholding the doctrine today.23 Finally, Section 
D addresses notable dissents within the Court that form the basis for much of 
the critique against the expansive interpretation of the Feres doctrine.24 
A. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 
Prior to the passage of the FTCA, there was a gradual but distinct shift in 
intra-military immunity jurisprudence in American common law.25 Courts ini-
tially recognized a civil cause of action for military personnel against superior 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 89–142 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 143–189 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 143–189 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 143–189 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 25–88 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 25–42 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 43–62 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 70–88 and accompanying text. 
 25 See John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life and Continues 
to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185, 189–90 (1988) (identifying the balance courts tried to strike between 
concerns about the effects intra-military tort claims could have on military discipline and fears regard-
ing potential harm from granting oppressive officers absolute immunity); Froelich, supra note 9, at 
706–08 (detailing the history of government immunity from damages involving intra-military torts). 
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officers acting maliciously or outside the scope of their authority.26 The advent 
of separate military systems of recourse, however, led courts to take a more 
deferential approach to military immunity.27 For these later courts, respect for 
military discipline and decision making demanded judicial abstention, particu-
larly where other available forums existed for military personnel to seek jus-
tice.28 
In 1946, however, Congress enacted the FTCA, providing individuals 
with a statutory basis for damage suits against the United States for injuries 
caused by any government employee’s negligent acts within the scope of his or 
her employment.29 The FTCA originated amidst growing concern in Congress 
over the injustice of permitting citizens to go uncompensated for the tortious 
acts of their government.30 Accordingly, the FTCA was the product of substan-
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390, 402–05 (1851) (balancing the dueling public 
interests of protecting military discipline and providing individual military personnel with a right to 
recovery for injuries suffered at the hands of superior officers). Articulating the scope of sovereign 
immunity in the military, Chief Justice Taney explained: “[I]t must be borne in mind that the nation 
would be equally dishonored, if it permitted the humblest individual in its service to be oppressed and 
injured by his commanding officer, from malice or ill-will, or the wantonness of power, without giv-
ing him redress in the courts of justice.” See id. at 403. 
 27 See Froelich, supra note 9, at 706–09 (discussing the transition of courts becoming less likely 
to allow civil remedies with the advent of independent military systems for recourse); see, e.g., Dob-
son v. United States, 27 F.2d 807, 808–09 (2d Cir. 1928) (reading into the Public Vessels Act, 46 
U.S.C. §§ 781–790 (1926) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 31101–31113 (2012)) (granting authority 
to sue the United States in admiralty when public vessels caused damages), a prohibition against mili-
tary civil damages claims, despite acknowledgment that no statutory language barred claims by mem-
bers of the military); Goldstein v. State, 24 N.E.2d 97, 99–100 (N.Y. 1939) (noting that under military 
law, the army constitutes a class separate and apart from the civil officers of the state, and therefore, 
members of the military shall not be civilly or criminally liable for any acts done by them in the per-
formance of their active service duties). 
 28 See Froelich, supra note 9, at 708–09. 
 29 See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2012)); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that “[m]uch of the sovereign immunity of the United States was swept away in 1946 with the 
passage of the FTCA”). The FTCA renders the government liable for: 
money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while 
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be liable . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 
 30 See Federal Tort Claims Act, §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680; S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 
30–31 (1946) (noting that the system for tort claim recovery prior to the FTCA was subject to criti-
cism for “being unduly burdensome to the Congress and as being unjust to the claimants, in that it 
does not accord to injured parties a recovery as a matter of right but base[d] any award that may be 
made on considerations of grace”); Astley, supra note 25, at 193 (asserting that the purpose of the 
FTCA was to provide a fair and accessible forum for injured persons and to relieve Congress of the 
burden of considering thousands of private bills each year, which had previously been a vehicle for 
claimants to recover from the government for tortious conduct); Froelich, supra note 9, at 709–10 
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tial congressional effort to mitigate the unjust consequences of sovereign im-
munity felt by victims.31 
Although the FTCA waived sovereign immunity, Congress carved out 
thirteen enumerated exceptions to the statute.32 In limiting governmental liabil-
ity with respect to military personnel, Congress precluded “[a]ny claim arising 
out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast 
Guard, during time of war.”33 Known as the “combatant activities exception,” 
the provision has been the source of confusion and disagreement regarding the 
scope of the rights of service members to bring suit against the government.34 
The text and legislative history of the FTCA, however, provide insight in-
to Congress’s considerations in drafting exceptions to the waiver of sovereign 
immunity.35 First, the language of the combatant activities exception evidences 
                                                                                                                           
(noting that the FTCA was a response to general concerns over the injustices presented when citizens, 
injured by the tortious acts of government officials, were denied recovery on the basis of sovereign 
immunity). 
 31 See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) (acknowledging the equity of a 
system in which all parties who benefit from government services share equally when government 
employees cause injury); Feres, 340 U.S. at 139 (recognizing the FTCA’s intent to mitigate unjust 
consequences of sovereign immunity); Froelich, supra note 9, at 709–10. 
 32 See FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012). 
 33 § 2680(j) (emphasis added). 
 34 See id. Compare Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51–52 (1949) (asserting that the 
FTCA’s terms were “clear” insofar as to establish that immunity did not turn on military active duty 
status alone, but rather, that a closer nexus between the injury and the conduct before that injury must 
exist before that injury can be categorized as “incident to service”), with Feres, 340 U.S. at 138, 146 
(distinguishing Brooks on the basis of active duty versus civilian status and holding that the govern-
ment is not liable under the FTCA for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in 
the course of activity incident to service). See also Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the exception did not generally preclude suits brought by servicemen under the FTCA, 
but rather, “demonstrat[es] that Congress specifically considered, and provided what it thought need-
ful for, the special requirements of the military. There was no proper basis for [the Court] to supple-
ment—i.e., revise—that congressional disposition”); Jennifer L. Zyznar, Comment, The Feres Doc-
trine: “Don’t Let This Be It. Fight,” 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 628 (2013) (arguing that the inter-
pretation of the combatant activities exception as an “incident to service” standard has caused confu-
sion regarding its application and has permitted an unacceptably broad interpretation of immunity). 
 35 See Johnson, 481, U.S. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the use of “combatant 
activities” and “during time of war” in the FTCA exception demonstrates that Congress considered 
and provided an exception to account for the special requirements of the military); Brooks, 337 U.S. at 
51–52; Astley, supra note 25, at 194–96 (noting that the text of the FTCA appears to permit suits on 
behalf of service members). In particular, the versions of the FTCA considered by Congress did not 
include the word “combatant” until just prior to the passage of the Act. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1400, 
79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (“Any claim arising out of the activities of the military or naval forces, or 
the Coast Guard, during the time of war.”); H. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (same). An 
amendment to insert the explanatory term “combatant” before the word “activities” was offered and 
agreed to without debate just one week prior to the passage of the law. See 92 Cong. Rec. 10,093 
(1946) (amending section 421(j) to include “combatant” without debate); see also Comment, The 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 548 n.99 (1947) (noting that “no explanation of the in-
tended scope of the term is to be found in committee hearings or reports” and arguing that “[t]he 
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Congress’s intent to narrow the scope of immunity to claims arising out of 
combatant activities during time of war, rather than expand the exception to 
deny recovery to military personnel entirely.36 Additionally, as the legislative 
history reveals, Congress considered a broader exception to preclude tort 
claims by all military service members, but ultimately removed the language in 
the final version of the FTCA.37 Moreover, of the eighteen tort claims bills in-
troduced in Congress between 1925 and 1935, all but two contained explicit 
provisions denying recovery to members of the military; thus, Congress’s deci-
sion to provide only a narrow military exception to the FTCA reflects its spe-
cific intention.38 
                                                                                                                           
amendment may have been inserted in view of the uncertain meaning of the companion phrase ‘during 
time of war’”). Statutory construction conventions mandate that when a statute is clear and unambigu-
ous on its face, it is not subject to construction and should be held to mean what it plainly expresses. 
See 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th 
ed., rev. vol. 2014). Moreover, the statutory construction principle expressio unius est exclusio alteri-
us provides that where a statute includes express exceptions, implication of other exceptions is pre-
cluded. See id. § 47:23; see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (articulating 
this principle in the context of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, stating that where Congress cre-
ates a number of limited exceptions to a statute’s broad sweep, the Court presumes no other exemp-
tions were intended). 
 36 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j); see Johnson, 481 U.S. at 693, 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
plain language of the statute renders the United States liable to all persons, including military person-
nel injured by government employees’ negligence, and rejecting the interpretation of the combatant 
activities exception to preclude suits brought by service members under the FTCA); Irvin M. Gottlieb, 
The Federal Tort Claims Act—A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 50 & n.180 (1946) (noting 
that no other tort claim bills at the time used the word “combatant” and asserting that the amendment 
during debate to include the word “combatant” indicates a clarification of Congress’s intent to exclude 
tort claims arising only from true combat in the military sense rather than all military operations); 
Froelich, supra note 9, at 710–11 (asserting that Congress considered provisions for significantly 
limiting the government’s liability in the context of military tort suits but settled on a narrower limita-
tion for combatant activities only); Richard W. McKee, Note, Defending an Indifferent Constitution: 
The Plight of Soldiers Used as Guinea Pigs, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 635 (1989) (arguing that the 
FTCA, by its terms and exceptions, does not exclude service members’ tort claims); Zyznar, supra 
note 34, at 626 (noting the strong presumption that the plain language of a statute expresses congres-
sional intent and that courts may only consider legislative history if a term appears ambiguous). 
 37 See Froelich, supra note 9, at 710–11 (noting Congress’s consideration and ultimate preclusion 
of a broader waiver of immunity for military personnel tort claims); Zyznar, supra note 34, at 626 
(arguing that the legislative history makes clear that Congress never intended to bar all service mem-
bers’ claims); see also supra note 35 (detailing the FTCA’s legislative history). 
 38 See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51–52 (asserting that the eighteen tort claim bills introduced between 
1925 and 1935, with the majority containing explicit provisions regarding members of the military, 
support the Court’s view that Congress intended for the FTCA to allow claims by armed service 
members); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. (1925); H.R. 12179, 68th Cong. (1925); S. 1912, 69th Cong. 
(1925); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. (1928); 
S. 4377, 71st Cong. (1930); H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. (1931); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. (1931); H.R. 
17168, 71st Cong. (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. (1932); S. 211, 72d Cong. (1932); S. 4567, 72d 
Cong. (1932); S. 1833, 73d Cong. (1933); H.R. 129, 73d Cong. (1933); H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. (1934); 
H.R. 2028, 74th Cong. (1935); S. 1043, 74th Cong. (1935); see also Astley, supra note 25, at 194–96 
(arguing that “[b]ecause the [FTCA] does not contain an exception excluding military suits, the ex-
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Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the FTCA in 
1949 in Brooks v. United States provides further insight into Congress’s intent 
in enacting the statute.39 Noting “it would be absurd to believe that Congress 
did not have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed,” 
the Court concluded that the plain language of the FTCA could not be inter-
preted to exclude all military personnel tort claims.40 Using the phrase “inci-
dent to service” synonymously with the FTCA’s combatant activities excep-
tion, the Court held that the FTCA permitted military service members to bring 
suits involving injuries not incident to service, even if an alternative compen-
sation system was available.41 In articulating the “incident to service” standard, 
however, the Court did not define the scope or boundaries of the criterion, 
leaving room for further interpretation by the Court.42 
B. Feres v. United States: A Judicial Exception to the FTCA 
Just one year after Brooks, the Supreme Court revisited the FTCA, read-
ing into the combatant activities provision a broader exception to the waiver of 
sovereign immunity for damage suits brought by military personnel.43 In 
Feres, the Court held that the FTCA immunizes the government from service 
member suits where the alleged injuries arise out of or were in the course of 
                                                                                                                           
pressio unius est exclusio alterius principle of statutory construction implies that Congress did not 
intent to create such an exception”). 
 39 See 337 U.S. at 51–53. 
 40 Id. at 51; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j). In Brooks, two claims were filed against the government 
alleging negligence at the hands of military personnel driving an Army truck off-base. Brooks, 337 
U.S. at 50. The accident resulted in the injuries of one off-duty serviceman and the death of another. 
Id.; see Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (noting furlough status of plaintiffs in Brooks). Though the Court nei-
ther defined nor provided any guidance on the meaning and scope of “incident to service,” the Court 
allowed the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed, explaining that recourse under the FTCA was predicated on 
whether the servicemen were engaged in military activities at the time of the accident. Brooks, 337 
U.S. at 52, 54. 
 41 See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51–52 (concluding that claims non-incident to service injuries were 
permitted unless they fell within one of the exceptions in the FTCA); Astley, supra note 25, at 198 
(concluding that claims non-incident to service injuries were allowable under the FTCA, even if an 
alternative compensation scheme existed). 
 42 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (distinguishing Brooks); Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51–52; Hunt v. United 
States, 636 F.2d 580, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that the term “incident to service” does not appear 
in the FTCA nor has it ever been defined by the Supreme Court, and that lower courts are left to ascer-
tain a definition by comparing and distinguishing Brooks and Feres); Astley, supra note 25, at 198–
201, 200 n.106 (remarking that the term “incident to service” remains the key determination in ascer-
taining whether an injured service member can bring a cause of action under the FTCA). 
 43 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (concluding that the FTCA did not provide for claims by service 
members against the government where injuries arose out of or were in the course of activity incident 
to service); Froelich, supra note 9, at 713 (asserting that Feres created a “relatively broad sphere of 
immunity for government officials from military claims by establishing such a significant exception to 
the FTCA”). 
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activity “incident to service.”44 Interpreting the FTCA as denying military per-
sonnel the ability to recover for injuries resulting from the alleged negligence 
of government employees, the Court’s limitation to the FTCA’s broad waiver 
of sovereign immunity represented an expansive interpretation of the combat-
ant activities exception.45 
Despite acknowledging a congressional purpose aimed at ameliorating the 
ill effects of sovereign immunity on innocent victims, the Court interpreted the 
FTCA as inapplicable to military service members’ claims for redress.46 Spe-
cifically, the Court created a dichotomy between Feres and Brooks, asserting 
that because the Feres plaintiffs’ injuries occurred during activities “incident to 
service,” the Feres decision was “wholly different” from the plaintiff’s cause 
of action in Brooks, which occurred off-base.47 The phrase “incident to ser-
vice,” undefined in Feres and absent from the text of the FTCA’s combatant 
activities exception, serves as the genesis of the jurisprudential exclusion of 
military personnel’s claims under the FTCA.48 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. Feres arose out of three separate negligence claims brought by service 
members against the government for injuries suffered while on active duty. Id. at 136–37. The first 
claim involved a wrongful death action brought by the widow of a serviceman killed in a barracks fire 
while the other two alleged medical malpractice. Id. The Second and Fourth Circuits held that the 
FTCA did not waive sovereign immunity for military personnel claims based on injuries incident to 
service, whereas the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the plain language of the FTCA permitted the service 
member’s claim. See Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 519–20 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 
135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 2–3 (10th Cir. 1949), rev’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); 
Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 536–37 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 45 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146; Froelich, supra note 9, at 713 (noting that Feres broadened the 
scope of sovereign immunity in the context of military tort claims against the government). In broad-
ening the scope of the FTCA’s combatant activities exception, the Supreme Court created the only 
judicially created exception to the FTCA. See Astley, supra note 25, at 201 (asserting that the exclu-
sion of all military personnel claims under the “incident to service” test in Feres is the sole judicially 
created exception to the FTCA); see also Johnson, 481 U.S. at 693, 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the statutory interpretation of the combatant activities exception in Feres is inconsistent with 
the text of the FTCA’s enumerated exceptions). 
 46 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 138–39, 146 (“We conclude that the Government is not liable under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course 
of activity incident to service.”) 
 47 See id. at 138, 146 (quoting Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52). Specifically, the Court focused on the 
location of the injuries in both cases, noting that the claimant in Brooks was injured off-base while 
off-duty whereas the claimants in Feres were injured on military property while on-duty. See id.; 
Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52. 
 48 See Astley, supra note 25, at 199–201 (arguing that the term “incident to service” was never 
defined in Feres and does not appear in the text of the FTCA, but that it remains the key determina-
tion for courts when deciding whether an injured service member can bring suit under the FTCA); 
Zyznar, supra note 34, at 614 (noting that the Court neither defined the term “incident to service” nor 
provided guidance on how to determine whether an injury was incident to service, leading to consid-
erable confusion in the lower courts). 
2014] The Justiciability of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims 1339 
The Court provided several rationales for dismissing the military plain-
tiffs’ claims for relief under the FTCA.49 In an appeal to tradition, the Court 
first relied on American common law, reasoning that courts customarily denied 
recovery for servicemen injured during the course of military duty.50 In look-
ing at the language of the FTCA, the Court determined that the statute waived 
sovereign immunity only in circumstances where there existed a corresponding 
private right of action that would impose liability.51 Because the Court found 
no parallel private action, permitting intra-military suits under the FTCA 
would impose novel and unprecedented liability on the government—a judicial 
leap the Court was unwilling to make.52 
Second, the Court reasoned that because the FTCA applies the substantive 
state tort law of the place where the act or omission occurred, burdensome 
choice-of-law questions would inevitably arise, and tort recovery would de-
pend on geographic considerations over which military personnel have no con-
trol.53 The Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended to subject 
military suits to the law of the state where a service member is stationed by 
mere fortuity, or perhaps misfortune, depending on the recovery allowed by the 
jurisdiction’s laws.54 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 139–45 (asserting that the FTCA “should be construed to fit, so far as 
will comport with its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies against the Government” and 
noting that the FTCA did not result from “an isolated and spontaneous flash of congressional generos-
ity. It mark[ed] the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immuni-
ty from suit”). 
 50 See id. at 139–42. 
 51 See id. at 141–42 (requiring a showing that the alleged government wrongdoing has a counter-
part in the private sector). Citing the text of the FTCA itself, the Court explained: 
[T]he Act goes on to prescribe the test of allowable claims, which is, “The United 
States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances . . .,” with certain exceptions not material here. It will 
be seen that this is not the creation of new causes of action but acceptance of liability 
under circumstances that would bring private liability into existence. 
Id. at 141 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 52 See id. at 141–42; see also Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 
AM. U. L. REV. 393, 433–44 (2010) (describing the Court’s analysis under the parallel private liability 
rationale). 
 53 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142–43 (noting that it would be irrational to allow the location of an 
injury to control the outcome of an active duty soldier’s tort claim who was involuntarily stationed in 
a certain jurisdiction and therefore subject to that particular law). The Court identified what it regard-
ed as a key distinction between that of the active duty service member and the off-duty or civilian 
claimant in a suit dependent on the law of the jurisdiction where the claim arises. See id. Specifically, 
the Court distinguished the circumstances of military personnel from that of a non-service member 
claimant who “is free to choose his own habitat and thereby limit the jurisdiction in which it will be 
possible for federal activities to cause him injury.” Id. 
 54 See id. (indicating that state tort laws differ in permissible recovery, defenses, and limitations 
of liability, which would ultimately result in an unfair and inconsistent system of tort recovery for 
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Under a similar line of reasoning, the Court’s third rationale focused on 
the “distinctly federal in character” relationship between the government and 
the military.55 This relationship—derived from the Constitution and federal 
statutes—has never been governed by state law.56 Because the structure of the 
FTCA looks directly to state law to resolve tort claim disputes, the Court rea-
soned that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to apply to a service mem-
ber’s injuries suffered incident to service.57 
Finally, the Court reasoned that the statutory compensation system af-
forded to military personnel through the Veterans’ Benefits Act precluded the 
conclusion that Congress sought to provide service members with any other 
form of compensation.58 The Court did not rely on the text of the FTCA, but 
instead cited the automatic compensation for injuries and death under the Vet-
erans’ Benefits Act, favorably comparing military compensation to civilian 
workmen’s compensation statutes.59 Characterizing the compensation scheme 
under the Veterans’ Benefits Act as a “system of simple, certain, and uniform 
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services,” the Court ra-
tionalized that Congress would have adjusted this remedy to conform with the 
FTCA if it intended the FTCA to provide a cause of action for injured service 
members.60 
By interpreting the FTCA this way, the Court returned sovereign immuni-
ty to the United States in matters of many claims for injuries of military per-
sonnel.61 Acknowledging the potential inaccuracy of its statutory interpreta-
tion, however, the Court afforded deference to Congress, noting that any incor-
                                                                                                                           
military personnel). The Court expressed further concerns regarding litigation hardship, particularly 
the time, expense, and procurement of witnesses for military personnel. See id. at 145. 
 55 See id. at 143. 
 56 See id. at 143–44. 
 57 See id.; see also Figley, supra note 52, at 434 (describing the “distinctly federal” relationship 
rationale and the Court’s observance that no federal law would permit recovery on the claims alleged). 
 58 See Veterans’ Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101–1002 (2012); Feres, 340 U.S. at 145 (describing 
the various types of compensation provided by the Veterans’ Benefits Act to military personnel in-
jured or killed in the line of duty). 
 59 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 145; see also Barry Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the 
Weapons of War, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 383, 401–02 (1985) (characterizing the Court’s reasoning as 
superficial and critiquing the Court’s decision to replace non-uniform recovery with the Veterans’ 
Benefits Act); Astley, supra note 25, at 203 n.125 (explaining that despite the Court’s suggestion, 
recovery under the Veterans’ Benefits Act is neither automatic nor certain like recovery under work-
men’s compensation statutes); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access 
to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1106–07 (1979) (arguing that unlike workers’ compen-
sation, military compensation systems are not certain enough to justify depriving military personnel 
the option of a tort claim). 
 60 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 144–45 (interpreting silence by Congress as evidence of its intent to 
exclude military personnel from seeking recovery under the FTCA). 
 61 See id. at 146; Froelich, supra note 9, at 713 (asserting that after Feres, service members are 
precluded from bringing suit under the FTCA for injuries suffered during military activity). 
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rect interpretation by the Court could be remedied by an amendment to the 
FTCA expressly permitting a cause of action for military personnel.62 
C. The Evolution and Expansion of the Feres Doctrine in  
Intra-Military Claims Under the FTCA 
Although the Feres doctrine remains good law today, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions since Feres represent a shift in, and expansion of, the original princi-
ples underlying the opinion.63 In particular, the doctrine has become synony-
mous with three core principles: (1) respect for and deference to decisions made 
in the context of intra-military supervision, under the “incident to service” ex-
ception to the FTCA; (2) the existence of an alternative compensation scheme 
and system of justice that is more than sufficient and capable of providing ser-
vice members with an alternative to tort recovery; and (3) the concern regarding 
undercutting, and thereby destabilizing, the military discipline structure if sol-
diers are permitted to hold their superior officers and other government officials 
liable in Article III courts.64 While many courts focus on the third principle—
maintenance of military discipline—the Court has acknowledged all three as 
justifications for keeping intra-military claims for relief out of civilian courts.65 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 138 (observing the limited guiding materials for statutory construction 
of the FTCA and noting that no conclusion by the Court could be above challenge by Congress). Justi-
fying its statutory interpretation, the Court stated in conclusion, “[w]e cannot impute to Congress such 
a radical departure from established law in the absence of express congressional command.” Id. at 
146. 
 63 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680–84; Johnson, 481 U.S. at 687–88, 691–92; Chappell v. Wallace, 
462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983); Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673–74 
(1977) (upholding the Feres doctrine under new rationales); Day, 167 F.3d at 682 (noting that in the 
half-century following Feres, the Court has reaffirmed and expanded the doctrine, while also adjust-
ing the underlying rationales). 
 64 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 688–91 (articulating and adopting the modified Feres rationales ad-
vanced by the Court in Stencel); Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672–73 (opining that the key factors for analysis 
under Feres include the distinctively federal relationship between the government and the military, the 
alternative compensation system available to military personnel through the Veterans’ Benefits Act, 
and the potential deleterious effect on military discipline and decision making that might attend gov-
ernment tort liability); Banner, supra note 6, at 726 (explaining the three core principles underlying 
Feres as articulated by the Court). 
 65 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 688–91 (endorsing three broad rationales for the Feres doctrine and 
applying them to preclude an action under the FTCA by a Coast Guard helicopter pilot killed during a 
search and rescue mission); Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 368–69 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that 
the three factors “determine whether there is a relevant relationship between the service member’s 
activity at the time of the injury and the military service”); Astley, supra note 25, at 209 (noting that 
the Court’s decisions led some lower courts to infer that the military discipline justification was the 
only relevant rationale in analyzing the applicability of Feres and whether a cause of action could be 
brought under the FTCA). But see Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349, 354 (11th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that allowing a claim under the FTCA would not threaten the military discipline system when the 
accident occurred on a public highway during a serviceman’s lunch break). 
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Because of the Court’s continual tinkering with the rationales to conform 
to the various intra-military claims brought under the FTCA, however, none of 
the current cases concerning the Feres doctrine articulate a consistent rationale 
for barring intra-military FTCA claims.66 Nevertheless, one principle routinely 
expressed in all Feres doctrine cases is the preservation of and deference to 
military decision making and discipline, viewed by the Court as necessary for 
the effective and efficient functioning of the military.67 Without defining “mili-
tary discipline” and “decision making,” the Court has adopted a broad standard 
of deference to protect military discipline and decision making from the effects 
of civil suits.68 Accordingly, the scope of the combatant activities exception 
has grown to exclude most claims brought by military personnel alleging inju-
ry during active duty.69 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 996–97 (asserting that none of the Feres doctrine cases articu-
late a clear and consistent rationale for barring service member tort suits under the FTCA). For exam-
ple, in 1954, in United States v. Brown, the Court attempted to clarify the “incident to service” test by 
distinguishing Brooks and Feres. See 348 U.S. 110, 112–13 (1954). In his dissenting opinion, howev-
er, Justice Hugo Black recognized the malleable rule created by the Court in Feres and the incon-
sistency in the Court’s interpretation of the FTCA. See id. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting) (“To permit a 
veteran to recover damages from the Government in circumstances under which a soldier on active 
duty cannot recover seems like an unjustifiable discrimination which the Act does not require.”). 
 67 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682 (“A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular 
suits would call into question military discipline and decision making would itself require judicial 
inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.”); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691 (“Suits brought 
by service members against the Government for service-related injuries could undermine the com-
mitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the 
broadest sense of the word.”); Brown, 348 U.S. at 112 (arguing that the “peculiar and special relation-
ship of the soldier to his superiors,” the effects of tort suits on military discipline, and the “extreme 
results” that would occur if the FTCA permitted claims for negligent acts committed in the course of 
military duty, led the Court to read the FTCA as excluding these claims); see also Astley, supra note 
25, at 217 (arguing that the military discipline rationale best articulates the Court’s modified founda-
tion for the Feres doctrine). 
 68 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 996–97 (noting the Court’s reliance on the deleterious effect 
allowing suits against superior officers or the government could have on discipline, and arguing that 
the Feres doctrine sweeps too many claims under its bar); Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judi-
cially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (noting the Court’s view that the 
military must not be inhibited by fear of judicial scrutiny in civil court when making decisions and 
implementing policies). As one scholar identified, military decision making involves a balance be-
tween the demands of the military mission and the safety of individual service members and the unit. 
Brou, supra at 3–4. 
 69 See. e.g., Cioca, 720 F.3d at 517–18 (citing Feres and the need for deference to military deci-
sion making when affirming the dismissal of claims brought by victims of intra-military sexual as-
sault); Smith, 196 F.3d at 775–78 (holding that a military plaintiff raped by a supervisor at an Army 
facility in Maryland could not bring a claim against the Army under the FTCA for failure to supervise 
because Feres cautioned that such a case would call into question the management decisions of those 
who exercise military leadership); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 564–65 (9th Cir. 1968) (ac-
knowledging that Supreme Court jurisprudence had eroded the significance and authority of the ra-
tionales in Feres, but denying relief under the FTCA given the appellate court’s limitations under 
Feres); see also Banner, supra note 6, at 727 n.20 (arguing that, as the Feres doctrine has devolved 
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D. Growing Discord: Dissents to the Feres Doctrine 
Notwithstanding the Feres doctrine’s momentum and evolution in the Su-
preme Court, four significant dissenting opinions highlight the disagreement 
within the Court over the decision in Feres and the core principles it has come 
to represent.70 Coupled with disapproval in the lower courts, these judicial cri-
tiques of the Feres doctrine suggest that it is not a matter of if, but when, the 
Court will reexamine the decision.71 
Critics of the Feres doctrine often cite Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in United States v. Johnson.72 In the 5-
4 Johnson decision, Justice Scalia authored a vigorous dissent concluding that 
Feres was wrongly decided.73 Grounded in a literal reading of the text of the 
FTCA as well as a thorough analysis of both the original and the post-Feres 
rationales, Justice Scalia’s dissent asserted that Congress unambiguously in-
tended to permit service members’ tort claims against the military under the 
FTCA.74 Justice Scalia, admitting that such suits could adversely affect mili-
                                                                                                                           
over several decades, courts have focused on the maintenance of military discipline as the primary 
rationale for barring claims under the FTCA by military personnel); Froelich, supra note 9, at 713 
(discussing the criticism of Feres and its subsequent rationales). 
 70 See Lanus v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2731, 2732 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Stanley, 483 
U.S. at 700, 704–06, 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 709–10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Johnson, 
481 U.S. at 693–95, 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 71 See, e.g., Cioca, 720 F.3d at 514, 518 (acknowledging the severity and troubling nature of 
plaintiffs’ claims but affirming dismissal because the principles expressed in Chappell, Stanley, and 
Feres dictate judicial abstention); Ruggiero v. United States, 162 F. App’x 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“We have no choice but to apply Feres to the instant case, despite the harshness of the result and our 
concern about the doctrine’s analytical foundations.”); Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869–70, 
876 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Feres doctrine as unconstitutional 
insofar as it violates service members’ equal protection rights and violates constitutional separation of 
powers principles, and advocating for the Supreme Court to overturn the decision); Bowers v. United 
States, 904 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1990) (“We conclude that we are obligated to affirm this judgment. 
We reach this result with a pronounced lack of enthusiasm.”); see also Banner, supra note 6, at 730–
31 (noting that the “emphatic and relatively unanimous disapproval of the Feres doctrine by lowers 
courts suggests that the question is not if the Court will revisit the doctrine but when,” and arguing 
that the “moment is ripe” for the Court to do so today). 
 72 Johnson, 481 U.S at 693–95, 698–700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Lanus, 133 S. Ct. at 2732 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Scalia that Feres was wrongly decided and should be 
reconsidered); Banner, supra note 6, at 747, 751–52 (noting that Justice Scalia’s dissent is often cited 
in support of revisiting the Feres doctrine); Astley, supra note 25, at 222 (arguing that the dissent in 
Johnson suggested support for overruling Feres). But see Figley, supra note 52, at 447–49 (maintain-
ing that Justice Scalia’s arguments regarding the parallel private liability requirement were flawed). 
 73 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692–93, 695, 699–700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was 
joined by Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens. Id. at 692. 
 74 See id. at 699–700 (regarding the three original Feres rationales and the post hoc rationaliza-
tion of military discipline as inadequate to support the Court’s failure to apply the FTCA as written). 
Justice Scalia concluded: 
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tary discipline or decision making, nevertheless relied on the text of the FTCA 
to conclude that claims could not be precluded on the grounds of deference to 
military decision making.75 
First discrediting the original rationales articulated by the Court in Feres, 
Justice Scalia concluded that none justified the judicially created doctrine and 
none were controlling on the Court.76 Moreover, Justice Scalia highlighted the 
inaccuracy of the Court’s military deference in post-Feres decisions, maintain-
ing that the Court’s submissiveness for fear of affecting military discipline and 
decision making was not only unsupported by the FTCA’s text, but also entire-
ly unnecessary.77 For the dissent, the potential effect of undermining the mili-
tary’s management did not appear so substantial as to warrant a bar on all suits 
by military personnel.78 Justice Scalia’s dissent, echoed by courts and critics 
disapproving of the Feres doctrine, reflects a call to action for the Court to re-
think its “outlandish” interpretation of the FTCA.79 
Supporting this call for judicial review, in 1987, in United States v. Stan-
ley, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and William J. Brennan, Jr. voiced con-
                                                                                                                           
Read as it is written, this language renders the United States liable to all persons, in-
cluding servicemen, injured by the negligence of Government employees. Other provi-
sions of the Act set forth a number of exceptions, but none generally precludes FTCA 
suits brought by servicemen. One, in fact, excludes “[a]ny claim arising out of the com-
batant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of 
war,” § 2680(j) (emphasis added), demonstrating that Congress specifically considered, 
and provided what it thought needful for, the special requirements of the military. There 
was no proper basis for us to supplement—i.e., revise—that congressional disposition. 
Id. at 693 (alterations in original). 
 75 Id. at 699 (arguing that Congress meant what it plainly and unambiguously said in both the 
waiver of sovereign immunity and the explicit exceptions to that waiver). 
 76 See id. at 694–95 (critiquing the majority’s reliance on and acceptance of the Feres rationales). 
In particular, the dissent discussed the history of the three original rationales and explained how none 
was controlling on the Court because of subsequent decisions refuting or dismissing their logic. See 
id. at 694–99; see also Astley, supra note 25, at 214–15 (noting the dissent’s critique of the Feres 
principles). 
 77 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 699–700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 78 See id. at 699 (contending that even if the Court were interpreting an ambiguous statute and 
could take into consideration the adverse effect of lawsuits on military discipline, “the effect upon 
military discipline is [not] so certain, or so certainly substantial”). 
 79 See id. at 699–700 (disagreeing with the majority’s argument that allowing military service 
member claims under the FTCA would require civilian courts to examine military decision making 
and therefore influence military discipline); see, e.g., Lanus, 133 S. Ct. at 2732 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (agreeing with Justice Scalia’s reasoning in asserting that Feres was wrongly decided); Costo, 
248 F.3d at 869–70, 876 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the principles of the Feres doc-
trine and finding the doctrine’s effect unconstitutional); Anne R. Riley, Note, United States v. John-
son: Expansion of the Feres Doctrine to Include Servicemembers’ FTCA Suits Against Civilian Gov-
ernment Employees, 42 VAND. L. REV. 233, 265 (1989) (asserting that, based on Justice Scalia’s dis-
sent, if the plaintiffs in Johnson had asked the Court to overrule Feres, four of the nine justices likely 
would have done so, and arguing that Feres will eventually be overruled). 
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cerns with what they considered unjust outcomes of the Feres doctrine.80 Ex-
pressing dismay at the majority’s characterization of the non-consensual ad-
ministration of psychotropic drugs as “incident to service,” Justice O’Connor 
regarded the act at issue as “so far beyond the bounds of human decency that 
as a matter of law it simply [could not] be considered a part of the military 
mission.”81 Justice O’Connor’s dissent suggests that certain acts should not 
receive the insulation of sovereign immunity and that the scope of “incident to 
service” must be tailored so as not to exclude inhumane acts from liability un-
der the FTCA.82 
Most recently, in the context of a denied petition for certiorari refusing to 
re-examine the Feres doctrine, Justice Clarence Thomas articulated a renewed 
appeal to the Court to revisit Feres.83 In his dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed 
with the Court’s interpretation of the FTCA, concluding that the preclusion of 
all claims by military personnel arising out of activities incident to service is 
not supported by the text of the statute.84 Justice Thomas, recognizing the 
thousands of claims denied on the basis of judicial abstention, wrote that the 
Feres doctrine has the “unfortunate consequence” of divesting service mem-
bers of any remedy, despite suffering injuries caused by the negligence of the 
government and its employees.85 Looking closely at the text of the FTCA, Jus-
tice Thomas concluded that, at the very least, the Supreme Court should recon-
sider Feres and the subsequent cases that comprise the doctrine.86 
Although these dissents have yet to become the majority opinion, they 
have provided greater authority and ammunition for lower courts and critics 
who advocate the overturning of the Feres doctrine.87 Moreover, the opinions 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 704–06 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 709–10 (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing). 
 81 See id. at 709 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In his separate dissent, Justice Brennan highlighted 
the historical rationale for permitting intentional tort claims against military superiors, asserting that 
while errors of judgment in the discharge of duty should be protected by sovereign immunity, private 
injury inflicted by superior officers as a result of “malice, cruelty or any species of oppression” should 
not be shielded in the same way. See id. at 699–700, 704–06 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Dinsman, 53 U.S. at 403). 
 82 See id. at 709 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Banner, supra note 6, at 754–55 (noting that Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent underscores the central issues of basic justice at stake in cases of intra-military 
rape and sexual assault). 
 83 Lanus, 133 S. Ct. at 2732 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See id.; Stanley, 483 U.S. at 699–700, 704–06, 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 709–710 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692–93, 695, 699–700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Costo, 
248 F.3d at 869–70, 876 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Johnson in argu-
ing for the overruling of the Feres doctrine); Day, 167 F.3d at 683 (citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Johnson for the proposition that Feres possibly deserves re-examination given that some of its ration-
ales are no longer persuasive). 
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reflect the percolating sentiment held by current and former members of the 
Court that Feres must be, at a minimum, re-examined.88 
II. WAGING A WAR WITHOUT AMMUNITION: THE EFFECT OF THE 
MILITARY’S INADEQUATE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE FERES  
DOCTRINE ON VICTIMS OF INTRA-MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Victims of intra-military sexual assault directly suffer the impact of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Feres v. United States.89 Whereas civil-
ian victims have opportunities for civil redress, military service members do 
not have a comparable judicial forum or legal standing to seek a civil remedy 
when they experience sexual assault while serving their country.90 Whatever 
civil remedy Congress intended to provide to military service members to 
bring suit against their government under the FTCA, the Feres doctrine has 
effectively foreclosed the statute’s application to claims arising out of intra-
military sexual assault.91 Moreover, courts have employed the principles un-
derlying the Feres doctrine to impede the efforts of victims of intra-military 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Lanus, 133 S. Ct. at 2732 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling for the Court to re-examine 
Feres); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 699–700 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the absurdity of the Feres 
doctrine’s “incident to service” standard as applied to the facts in Stanley); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 699–
700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing Feres was wrongly decided and has been rightly criticized); 
Astley, supra note 25, at 222 (highlighting the importance of the dissent in Johnson as indicative of 
members of the Court’s support for overturning the Feres doctrine); Riley, supra note 79, at 265 (ar-
guing Feres will eventually be overturned given the support of members of the Court in the Johnson 
dissent). 
 89 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); see, e.g., Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 
517–18 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that the claims asserted by the victims of intra-military sexual assault 
were barred by the Feres doctrine because the injuries alleged arose out of activities incident to mili-
tary service); Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58, 60–61 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding that Feres 
barred a claim against the United States for a service member’s suicide allegedly caused by her drill 
sergeant’s sexual harassment and assault); Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2013) (dis-
missing the class action complaint of victims of intra-military sexual assault, citing the court’s inabil-
ity to provide a remedy in light of the Feres doctrine); Banner, supra note 6, at 738 (noting that mili-
tary sexual assault claims brought in district court are dismissed based on courts’ application of the 
Feres principles); see also Scott A. Liljegren, Note, Winning the War Against Sexual Harassment 
Battle by Battle: Why the Military Justice Model Works—A Proposal for Federal and State Statutory 
Reform, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 175, 201–03 (1998) (noting that the Feres doctrine prohibits military 
service members from pursuing a civil claim against anyone for sexual harassment inflicted while on-
duty). 
 90 See Banner, supra note 6, at 725 (noting that Feres has been interpreted to bar negligent and 
intentional tort claims by service members against the government and military officers, along with 
claims for blatant constitutional rights violations); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 993–94 (arguing that 
the Feres doctrine forecloses the two methods by which private citizens can sue the government). 
 91 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 517–18; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 20; Elizabeth A. Reidy, Comment, 
Gonzalez v. United States Air Force: Should Courts Consider Rape to Be Incident to Military Ser-
vice?, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 635, 656, 665 (2005) (noting that the Feres doctrine 
limits the access of service members to civil remedies). 
2014] The Justiciability of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims 1347 
sexual assault pursuing a civil remedy under other statutory or constitutional 
grounds.92 
Section A of this Part briefly addresses the forums for justice within the 
military for sexual assault victims and identifies the limitations inherent in the 
military justice system for providing redress.93 Section B then provides exam-
ples of the effect of the Feres doctrine on service members seeking a remedy 
in Article III courts for injuries arising out of intra-military sexual assault.94 
A. Military Justice: A System Set Apart 
The uncomfortable reality of rampant sexual assault, subverting all ranks 
of the military, coupled with frequently unsatisfying court-martial decisions, 
has captured the attention of Congress.95 Moreover, the intra-military sexual 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 517–18; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 20, 23–24; Diane H. Mazur, 
Rehnquist’s Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 
701, 751 (2002) (noting the limitations to civil redress in cases of intra-military sexual harassment). 
For example, in 1983, in Chappell v. Wallace, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the military defer-
ence rationale in Feres to preclude military service members from seeking a Bivens remedy. See 462 
U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983). Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies only to civilian 
employees and does not extend to uniformed members of the armed forces. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2016(a) (2012); Roper v. Dep’t of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d. Cir. 1987) (“[W]e refuse to extend a 
judicial remedy for alleged discrimination in civilian employment to the dissimilar employment con-
text of the military, especially given the need for deference to the military in matters involving hierar-
chy and structure of command.”); accord Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928–29 (9th Cir. 
1983); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 93 See infra notes 95–131 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 132–142 and accompanying text. 
 95 See Darren Samuelsohn, Claire McCaskill’s Sexual Assault Bill Passes, POLITICO (Mar. 10, 
2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/claire-mccaskill-military-sexual-assault-bill-
104499.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VF49-LB94 (documenting the 97–0 vote in the Senate on 
legislation that establishes new protections for victims of military sexual assault, including eliminating 
the “good soldier” legal defense from evidence rules, which allows evidence of a military service 
member’s military record, behavior, and achievements in the military as part of their defense); David 
Vergun, New Law Brings Changes to Uniform Code of Military Justice, ARMY NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 
8, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121444, archived at http://perma.cc/
NK5U-5MWQ (reporting on the recent changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) in 
the latest National Defense Authorization Act, many of which address how sexual assault cases are 
handled in the military justice system); see also Helene Cooper, Senate Rejects Blocking Military 
Commanders from Sex Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at A11 (reporting on the Senate’s 
rejection of the Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, which sought to remove military com-
manders from the decision-making process in deciding whether to prosecute intra-military sexual 
assault cases); Press Release, Greg Jacob, Policy Director, Serv. Women’s Action Network, Statement 
in Response to Sentencing Announcement in the Case Against Brig. Gen. Jeffrey A. Sinclair (Mar. 20, 
2014), available at http://servicewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Press-Release-Sinclair-
Sentence.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A7YS-GV69 (“Today’s sentencing is reflective of a case 
that fell apart long before today. . . . A system shaky enough to be rocked by allegations of undue 
command influence cannot provide justice for our troops. The General Sinclair case will go down in 
history as yet another reason we need . . . [the] Military Justice Improvement Act [of 2013].”). 
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assault crisis raises further questions about the limitations of military justice 
more generally—particularly the lack of substantive and procedural due pro-
cess available to military service members.96 This Section identifies the legal 
and institutional deficiencies military service members face in seeking jus-
tice.97 Specifically, it highlights (1) the inadequacy of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”); (2) the lack of standing under Title VII; and (3) the 
failures of the Department of Veterans Affairs disability compensation struc-
ture.98 
1. The Inherent Injustices and Limitations of the UCMJ 
On May 5, 1950, Congress enacted the UCMJ.99 The statute represented a 
reaction to widespread perceptions of fundamental unfairness inherent in the 
disciplinary Articles of War and the Articles for the Government of the Navy, 
which, until the UCMJ, served as the statutory basis for military justice in the 
United States.100 The UCMJ remedied many abuses and infused integrity into 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See Rachel Natelson, A Case for Federal Oversight of Military Sexual Assault, 43 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 277, 277, 281 (2009) (arguing that civil courts offer a considerably more active forum in 
which victims can vindicate their rights and obtain redress for injuries suffered as a result of sexual 
assault); see also Sexual Assault in the Military: Briefing Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
113th Cong. 10–18 (2013) (statement of Rachel Natelson, Legal Director for the Service of Women’s 
Action Network) [hereinafter Natelson Statement], available at http://www.eusccr.com/Transcript
%20of%20briefing%20on%20Military%20Sexual%20Assault-FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/QXW9-M7YN (highlighting the importance of the civil courts for victims of intra-military sexual 
assault in pursuing claims against both individual assailants and against their employer, the military, 
for negligence). 
 97 See infra notes 99–131 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 99–131 and accompanying text. 
 99 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) [hereinafter 
UCMJ] (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (2012)). The UCMJ is implemented through Executive 
Orders of the President of the United States pursuant to his authority under Article 36 of the UCMJ. 
10 U.S.C. § 836. Those Executive Orders form a comprehensive volume of law known as the Manual 
for Courts-Martial (MCM). See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. I, I-1 (2012 
ed.), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/CB9L-MAYF (“The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining 
good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military 
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.”). 
 100 See Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission 
Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 
57, 57–58 (noting that the UCMJ originated out of public outcry over the military justice system, 
particularly the prevalence of “unlawful command influence” in the court-martial system). Signifi-
cantly, however, the new statute did not remove the military commander from the court-martial pro-
cess, and in fact preserved a very substantial role for commanders, in order to ensure that the military 
justice system would remain responsive to the special needs and exigencies of the military. See id. at 
70 (noting the UCMJ drafters’ deference to the historical role of the commander and their mainte-
nance of the commander’s function in judicial processes); John S. Cooke, The Twenty-Sixth Annual 
Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Manual for Courts-Martial 20X, 156 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1998) (recog-
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the military justice system by, among other changes, increasing the role of 
lawyers and establishing important rights for service members.101 Since its en-
actment, however, fundamental notions of fairness have shifted and the UCMJ 
remains limited in its ability to fully and fairly protect the constitutional rights 
of service members in the same way the civilian judicial system guarantees 
certain rights and protections to private citizens.102 
The United States military justice system enjoys unique autonomy from 
the purview of civilian oversight.103 This self-contained legal framework also 
lacks independence from the military’s hierarchal structure.104 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has abstained from intervening in any claim that even remotely 
calls into question military decision making and discipline.105 This judicial 
                                                                                                                           
nizing Congress’s efforts in the UCMJ to create a true judicial system within the military, but critiqu-
ing the commander’s central role in the process). 
 101 See Barry, supra note 100, at 70 (stating that the UCMJ increased the role of lawyers and 
established a number of important appellate rights for service members); Cooke, supra note 100, at 7–
9 (noting the critical role of extensive appellate rights and of the Court of Military Appeals in protect-
ing the integrity of the military justice system). 
 102 See Barry, supra note 100, at 59–60 (recognizing that the UCMJ was a step forward in trans-
forming military courts into instruments of justice rather than vehicles for discipline, but arguing that 
the reform was incomplete); Liljegren, supra note 89, at 202–03 (noting that military service members 
who “stand ready to fight for the preservation of the nation and its federal law are many times the 
same individuals denied the protections of that law”). Some argue that convictions under the UCMJ 
could not withstand an appellate court’s review when applying the constitutional standards applicable 
to every other criminal justice system in the United States. See Barry, supra note 100, at 60. 
 103 See Banner, supra note 6, at 773 (“The Court’s 30-year silence with regard to issues of intra-
military affairs has led to the development of a mythological idea that the military is wholly and 
properly removed from civilian oversight.”). The justification for this isolated structure is rooted in 
the historical concept that the military should have the discretion to discipline its own members, free 
of outside interference, because of the unique circumstances of the military structure and demands in 
times of battle and war. See id. at 728–29; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authori-
tarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 441, 443 (1999) (noting the Supreme Court’s great 
deference to the military institution); Mazur, supra note 92, at 712 (describing military discipline as 
“entire[ly] outside the bounds of the civilian legal system”); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1010 n.74 
(noting that the congressional rulemaking process provides a significant amount of discretion to the 
military). 
 104 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-579, MILITARY JUSTICE: OVERSIGHT 
AND BETTER COLLABORATION NEEDED FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICA-
TIONS (2011) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Natelson, supra note 96, at 278 (noting the inherent conflict 
of interest due to the relationship between the decision-making commander and the offender); Schmid, 
supra note 4, at 489 (“The military justice system is commander-driven—that is, individual com-
manders have discretion in deciding whether to pursue criminal charges in response to allegations of 
sexual misconduct.”). According to the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), 
the commanding officer has oversight in determining the course of justice for violations of the UCMJ. 
See GAO REPORT, supra at 4–5 (noting that “military commanding officers are responsible for good 
order and discipline in their commands,” and ultimately, they “are accountable for disposing of allega-
tions of offenses in a timely manner and at the lowest appropriate level of disposition”). 
 105 See Chemerinsky, supra note 103, at 443 (noting that the Court’s decisions keep “those in the 
military from receiving any judicial redress for even the most egregious violations of rights”); see, 
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deference, coupled with the military’s legal system positioned as an island 
within America’s civil legal and social framework, together form much of the 
barrier to justice faced by military victims.106 
Currently, the commanding officer holds the position of primary investi-
gator, fact finder, and first adjudicator in military sexual assault cases.107 Ra-
ther than having the adequacy of a commanding officer’s supervision and 
management of his unit called into question during court-martial proceedings, 
a commanding officer has significant incentives to dismiss claims.108 Com-
manding officers often choose to deflect blame by attacking the credibility of 
the victims and their allegations rather than fairly and impartially investigating 
and permitting viable claims to proceed through the military justice system.109 
                                                                                                                           
e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682–84 (1987) (reasoning that the risk of erroneous judi-
cial decisions and the disruption litigation would cause to the military regime counsels against judicial 
intervention); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 (1987) (noting that suits brought by service 
members could undermine military discipline and therefore should not be permitted). 
 106 See DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR 
MILITARY STRONGER 4 (2010) (arguing that the military increasingly is a social order of its own, sepa-
rated from the civilian population); Banner; supra note 6, at 728–29; see also Kristen E. Gillibrand, Aria-
na and Ben Klay Give Emotional Testimony at Bipartisan MJIA Press Conference (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/video/ariana-and-ben-klay-give-emotional-testimony-at-
bipartisan-mjia-press-conference, archived at http://perma.cc/M6GM-8UT7 [hereinafter Klay Statement] 
(describing the crisis in the justice system and the problem created by the Supreme Court prohibiting 
private suits and the insular procedures for handling rape claims within the military). 
 107 See GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 4–5; GREG JACOB & ESTEFANIA PONTI, LEARNING 
FROM OUR ALLIES: REFORMING THE U.S. MILITARY TO STOP SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2011), available at 
http://servicewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Learning-From-Our-Allies_Final.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/YZY5-56WE [hereinafter SWAN Report]. A commanding officer can decide not to 
pursue an investigation, deny prosecution, or prescribe other non-judicial punishments. See GAO 
REPORT, supra note 104, at 4–5; SWAN Report, supra at 5. In 2010, over 40% of sexual assault per-
petrators were punished through non-judicial punishments or other administrative actions. SWAN 
Report, supra at 5. In six percent of cases, perpetrators were given the option to resign in lieu of court-
martial. Id. 
 108 See Sarah Childress, Why the Military Has a Sexual Assault Problem, PBS FRONTLINE (May 10, 
2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/why-the-military-
has-a-rape-problem/, archived at http://perma.cc/S4Z5-BPVN (noting the strong incentive for command-
ers to avoid pursuing sexual assault allegations because of the possible risk to their careers); Klay State-
ment, supra note 106 (noting that military officials have “an interest in avoiding the exposure of their 
commands’ serious failures, a natural disinclination against believing their commands could commit such 
failures, a strong interest in destroying the credibility of any who would allege such failures, and no legal 
training that would make them qualified to properly perform these tasks anyway”). As a former Navy 
petty officer third-class and victim of intra-military rape observed, “You don’t want to be the commander 
that calls your superior to say you’ve had an allegation of rape in your unit. . . . It makes you look bad, 
and affects your ability to be considered for a promotion.” Childress, supra. 
 109 See Natelson, supra note 96, at 278; Childress, supra note 108. As one critic of this system 
stated: 
The results of [a military justice system without independence from the military hierar-
chy] are tendencies to cover-up crimes that could reflect poorly on the leadership, and 
retaliate against those who would allege such crimes. Cover-up is often far less risky 
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Military victims who choose to proceed with a sexual assault claim under 
the UCMJ have two options—restricted or unrestricted reporting.110 While re-
stricted reporting allows the victim to receive medical treatment and counsel-
ing, it does not initiate an investigation within the military and is regarded as a 
means to deal with an admittedly hostile climate by ensuring anonymity and 
safety within the unit.111 A disclosure of sexual assault through unrestricted 
reporting, on the other hand, triggers a report to the victim’s commanding of-
ficer who then has discretion to pursue criminal charges, non-judicial punish-
ment or no action in response to allegations.112 
Due to the risk of retaliation and further abuse after reporting the crime, 
victims experience pressure to refrain from reporting altogether.113 For those 
victims that do come forward with an unrestricted report, the court-martial 
process further denies the due process and justice afforded civilians in parallel 
criminal cases, primarily because of the commanding officer’s role in initializ-
ing the court-martial process and the additional influence from the military 
hierarchy on judges adjudicating the claims and sentencing offenders.114 For 
                                                                                                                           
than exposing an ugly truth, and retaliation serves the purposes of scaring people away 
from making serious allegations, and destroying the credibility of those who do make 
them. Where cover-up is infeasible, the tendency is to assign and isolate blame at the 
lowest plausible level. 
Klay Statement, supra note 106. 
 110 See SWAN Report, supra note 107, at 4; Schmid, supra note 4, at 485–86. 
 111 See SWAN Report, supra note 107, at 4; Schmid, supra note 4, at 485–86; Department of 
Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, Reporting Options—Restricted Reporting, 
http://www.myduty.mil/index.php/reporting-options/restricted-reporting, archived at http://
perma.cc/986L-NF3X. The natural consequence of anonymity through restricted reporting, however, 
is the ability of the alleged perpetrator and his supervisors to escape any form of investigation or jus-
tice. See Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, supra. 
 112 See SWAN Report, supra note 107; Schmid, supra note 4, at 485–86; Department of Defense 
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, Reporting Options—Unrestricted Reporting, 
http://www.myduty.mil/index.php/reporting-options/unrestricted-reporting, archived at http://
perma.cc/86AE-U99L. According to the Department of Defense’s Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response Office (“SAPRO”), unrestricted reporting is “recommended for victims of sexual assault 
who desire medical treatment, counseling and an official investigation of the crime.” Department of 
Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, supra. The benefits of unrestricted reporting 
as set forth by SARPO include a “sense of closure or healing (which aids recovery);” the “ability for 
military to potentially hold the offender accountable;” and “ensur[ing] the safety of others.” Id. 
 113 See Banner, supra note 6, at 737–38 (noting that “[o]ne-third of the 36 plaintiffs in the Klay 
and Cioca cases were officially reprimanded, sanctioned, or discharged in retaliation for making com-
plaints. Others resigned after having been ordered to continue to serve under direct command of al-
leged rapists or their friends and protectors”); Schmid, supra note 4, at 480 (regarding sexual assault 
in the military as a “vastly underreported crime”). 
 114 See SWAN Report, supra note 107, at 4–5. Service member victims do have some recourse 
against undue commander influence under Article 138 of the UCMJ, which provides that: 
[a]ny member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding 
officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, 
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many offenders, rather than being court-martialed, they face much lesser 
charges under either Article 15 of the UCMJ for non-judicial penalties or Arti-
cle 134 of the UCMJ for adultery, both of which significantly reduce the sen-
tence and in some cases, allow the offender to continue serving in the mili-
tary.115 Accordingly, the military criminal justice system, intended to vindicate 
victims’ rights and punish and deter sexual assault offenders, often proves en-
tirely ineffective in its stated purposes.116 
2. Military Service Members Lack the Civil Protections the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 Provides to Civilians in the Workplace 
The consequences of the military justice system’s shortcomings become 
even more deleterious because the military as an institution enjoys immunity 
from vicarious liability.117 Whereas civilian employees can seek recourse from 
their employers for intra-office sexual harassment and assault, military service 
members do not benefit from the same workplace protections.118 Specifically, 
military service members have no recourse under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 or other similar civil protections that would otherwise provide 
military victims with a means to hold their employer—the United States Mili-
                                                                                                                           
may complain to any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint 
to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom 
it is made. 
10 U.S.C. § 938 (2012). The effectiveness of an Article 138 complaint, however, is limited because 
the response to the complaint is still at the discretion of the command structure. See SWAN Report, 
supra note 107, at 8. 
 115 See Banner, supra note 6, at 737–38 (describing the lesser charges often brought against of-
fenders and noting that in the Klay and Cioca class action lawsuits, many alleged perpetrators were 
promoted, with one featured in a Marine Corps calendar after allegations were brought against him); 
Greg Botelho & Marlena Baldacci, Brigadier General Accused of Sex Assault Must Pay Over 
$20,000; No Jail Time, CNN (Mar. 20, 2014, 6:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/20/justice/
jeffrey-sinclair-court-martial/, archived at http://perma.cc/4983-FYWH (reporting that Brig. Gen. 
Jeffrey Sinclair pled guilty to adultery and mistreating one of his accusers in a deal that dropped the 
sexual assault and sodomy charges against him). 
 116 See Banner, supra note 6, at 736–38, 769. 
 117 See Natelson, supra note 96, at 279 (“While Title VII’s applicability to military personnel has 
yet to reach the Supreme Court, a consensus has emerged among federal appellate courts that the law 
does not apply to uniformed members of the armed services.”); see also Gonzalez v. United States Air 
Force, 88 F. App’x 371, 378 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]his Court has clearly held Title VII inapplicable to 
members of the armed forces.”); accord Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928–29 (“In light of [the] cases, the 
legislative history, and the pertinent statutory language, we hold section 717(a) does not make Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to uniformed members of the armed forces.”). 
 118 See Gonzalez, 88 F. App’x at 378 (dismissing service member’s claim for relief under Title 
VII, noting Title VII’s inapplicability to members of the armed forces); Natelson, supra note 96, at 
281 (noting that “unlike their civilian counterparts, military harassment victims have virtually no 
avenue for relief when their employer fails to take appropriate corrective action in response to their 
complaints”). 
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tary—responsible for affecting their employment, unreasonably interfering 
with their work performance, or creating a hostile or offensive work environ-
ment.119 
Workplace protections in the civilian legal system affect employers and 
institutions by functioning as an important deterrent.120 Military and Depart-
ment of Defense officials lack this institutional incentive that a statutory 
scheme like Title VII provides, namely dissuading bad actors, prompting the 
institution to act with greater care in protecting its employees, and encouraging 
the institution to afford justice to victims.121 Despite an Equal Opportunity 
(“EO”) office at each military base responsible for reviewing complaints of 
discrimination or sexual harassment, this reporting structure has no enforce-
ment authority and is not intended to serve as an advocate for victims.122 Simi-
larly, the Inspector General (“IG”) responsible for independently investigating 
fraud, waste, and abuse, including sexual harassment and sexual assault, has no 
enforcement authority and can only make findings and recommendations, im-
plementation of which is subject to commander discretion.123 
Without the threat of a civil suit, military tolerance of sexual harassment 
and assault in the “workplace” goes unchecked and undeterred, weakening the 
institution both internally and in its outward reputation.124 An effective penalty 
                                                                                                                           
 119 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ee–2016(a) (2012); see Gonzalez, 88 F. App’x at 378 (dismissing service 
member’s claim for relief under Title VII and noting Title VII’s inapplicability to members of the 
armed forces); accord Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the 
impact of employer tolerance of sexual assault and harassment in the workplace, particularly where 
the workplace is the Armed Forces of the United States). 
 120 See Natelson Statement, supra note 96 (“By holding powerful institutions financially account-
able for inaction, successful civil suits exercise an important deterrent effect against workplace 
crime.”); see also Anne E. Craige, The Separation of Liability and Remedy in Mixed Motive Title VII 
Actions: Bibbs v. Block, 28 B.C. L. REV. 119, 119 (1986) (“The central objectives of Title VII are to 
deter employer discrimination, compensate victims of discrimination, and vindicate a public interest in 
eliminating discrimination.”). 
 121 See Gonzalez, 88 F. App’x at 378; Natelson, supra note 96, at 279–81; Natelson Statement, 
supra note 96. 
 122 See Natelson Statement, supra note 96 (noting that the EO generally has a greater responsibil-
ity to the military than to the individual complainant, and many service members who report incidents 
of sexual harassment or assault to the EO experience retaliation, particularly when the subject of the 
complaint is a supervisor); SWAN Report, supra note 107, at 6 (stating that one flaw with EO com-
plaints is that EOs lack enforcement authority and can only make recommendations). 
 123 See Natelson Statement, supra note 96; SWAN Report, supra note 107, at 7. The IG deter-
mines at the outset whether to investigate a complaint. Natelson Statement, supra note 96. Because of 
the conflict of interest between the IG and command, few complaints are investigated. See id. (noting 
that “[a]ccording to a recent [GAO] study, the IG fully investigated only 29% of all reprisal com-
plaints between 2006 and 2011, and substantiated only a fifth of those investigated”). 
 124 See Smith, 196 F.3d at 778. As the Seventh Circuit explained: 
[E]mployer tolerance of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the workplace is a se-
rious matter. Sexual assault and sexual harassment is always demeaning and often per-
manently scars the victim. Furthermore, it renders the workplace less productive and 
 
1354 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1329 
structure is necessary to affect institutional changes to the military culture of 
sexual assault and retaliation.125 
3. The Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Disability Compensation 
System for Military Sexual Trauma Is Sorely Lacking 
The alternative compensation system available to military service mem-
bers—namely veteran’s disability benefits—is a particularly arduous process, 
involving years of struggle and ultimately providing insufficient compensation, 
if any at all.126 In order to obtain disability compensation through the VA for 
military sexual trauma—the only form of monetary relief available to victims 
of intra-military sexual assault—victims must prove that (1) they had an inci-
dent of military sexual trauma while on active duty; (2) they are currently di-
agnosed with a mental or physical disability; and (3) their disabilities were 
caused or worsened by the military sexual trauma they suffered in service.127 
                                                                                                                           
stifles the initiative and creative capacity of the organization. When the organizations 
involved are the Armed Forces of the United States, the victim, in addition to the suf-
fering experienced by all such victims, is deprived of the very special satisfaction that 
military service to the Country should bring. Tolerance of such behavior also results in 
a warping of military discipline, a lack of military readiness, and a weakening of na-
tional security. Democratic support for military institutions is eroded when citizens do 
not believe that their children, and those of their neighbors, will be treated with dignity 
and respect during their period of service. 
Id. 
 125 See Dana Michael Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One: Four Proposals to Combat 
Sexual Harassment in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 194–95 (2007) (noting that the 
primary justification for excluding service member claims under Title VII rests on the military disci-
pline rationale); Natelson, supra note 96, at 279–81 (asserting that the “time is ripe” for removing the 
institutional immunity which prevents outside judicial review that could operate as a deterrent). 
 126 See Banner, supra note 6, at 726, 764–67 (describing veterans’ disability benefits as particu-
larly elusive for victims of intra-military sexual assault and detailing the many barriers to receiving 
compensation); THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2011) (documenting the epidemic of 
sexual assault in the military and the struggle of victim veterans trying to obtain benefits from the 
VA). 
 127 See Service Women’s Action Network & Vietnam Veterans of America, Petition for Rule-
making to Promulgate Regulations Governing Service-Connection for Mental Health Disabilities 
Resulting from Military Sexual Assault, at 1–2 (June 27, 2013), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/Clinics/vlsc_SWAN_petitionRuleMaking.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5REN-
H6G4 [hereinafter SWAN Petition]. “Military sexual trauma” (MST) is defined in the UCMJ as “psy-
chological trauma . . . result[ing] from a physical assault of a sexual nature, battery of a sexual nature, 
or sexual harassment which occurred while the veteran was serving on active duty, active duty for 
training, or inactive duty training.” 38 U.S.C. § 1720D(a)(1) (2012), amended by Veteran’s Access, 
Choice and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128 Stat. 1754. Sexual harassment is 
defined as “repeated, unsolicited verbal or physical contact of a sexual nature which is threatening in 
character.” § 1720D(2)(d), amended by Veteran’s Access, Choice and Accountability Act, 128 Stat. 
1754. 
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Because service members often do not report incidents of sexual assault, 
however, little to no documentation exists to prove that a sexual assault or har-
assment occurred.128 Moreover, many military men and women who report 
sexual assault by another service member are later medically discharged for a 
personality disorder, regardless of the veracity of the diagnosis.129 Because the 
VA considers personality disorders to be non-compensable pre-existing condi-
tions, benefits are routinely denied for a vast majority of victims of intra-
military sexual assault.130 Accordingly, the procedural and institutional flaws 
inherent in the VA’s disability benefits compensation structure for victims of 
military sexual trauma further entrench victims in a legal and administrative 
system without rights or recourse.131 
B. Broad Application of the Feres Doctrine Seals Shut the Doors to Civilian 
Courthouses for Military Victims of Sexual Assault 
The Feres doctrine has guaranteed the inability of service members to sue 
in federal court for injuries arising out of or in the course of activity incident to 
service—interpreted to include nearly all activity during the tenure of an active 
duty soldier.132 The deleterious effects of the Feres doctrine are readily appar-
                                                                                                                           
 128 See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Disability Compensation for Personal Assault or 
Military Sexual Trauma (MST) (Sept. 2012), http://www.benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/factsheets/
serviceconnected/MST.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4B85-V2V2. The VA asserts that the eviden-
tiary requirements are “relaxed” for a victim establishing an incident of military sexual trauma. See id. 
In particular, the VA maintains that “markers” (i.e. signs, events, or circumstances) are sufficient 
proof, and incidents of sexual trauma may be proven by police records, pregnancy tests, statements 
from friends in service, family members, counselors or clergy, documentation of a request for transfer, 
evidence of a drug or alcohol problem, changes in job performance or social or economic behavior, 
marital and/or sexual difficulties, or incidents of depression or anxiety for which no other cause has 
been identified. Id. Notwithstanding the VA’s stated policies on levels and types of proof, the VA 
denies many veterans’ disability benefits claims on account of insufficient evidence. See SWAN Peti-
tion, supra note 127, at 3, 23–29 (asking the VA to promulgate new regulations to allow victims of 
rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment to provide the documentation necessary to corroborate 
their claims); Greg Botelho, Report: Troops Filing Sexual Trauma Claims Less Likely to Get PTSD 
Benefits, CNN (Nov. 7, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/07/us/aclu-military-sexual-
trauma/, archived at http://perma.cc/34MA-MUYH (reporting that a study from Service Women’s 
Action Network and American Civil Liberties Union found that troops who reported suffering post-
traumatic stress disorder as a result of sexual trauma have significantly lower success rates in obtain-
ing benefits compared to those who say they suffer from PTSD for other reasons). 
 129 See David S. Martin, Rape Victims Say Military Labels Them ‘Crazy,’ CNN (Apr. 14, 2012, 
12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/14/health/military-sexual-assaults-personality-disorder/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JHW6-ENZG (reporting on the pattern of the military using psychiatric 
diagnoses to get rid of women who report sexual assault). 
 130 See id. 
 131 See SWAN Petition, supra note 127, at 3, 23–29. 
 132 See Banner, supra note 6, at 725–27. The Feres doctrine insulates the activities of military 
officers, particularly military commanders charged with overseeing rape investigations and trials, 
providing these officials with immunity from civil lawsuits for the wrongs they commit, whether neg-
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ent in two recent class action lawsuits filed by military men and women, seek-
ing to hold Department of Defense and other military officials accountable for 
alleged institutional failings that contributed to pervasive intra-military sexual 
assault in the military.133 In 2012, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, filed in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Klay v. Panetta, filed in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a combined total 
of thirty-six victims of intra-military sexual assault sought justice in civilian 
court against former Defense secretaries Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Gates, and 
Leon Panetta, as well as other current and former heads of the Marine Corps 
and Navy.134 Pointing to the military’s repeated failure to take affirmative steps 
to prevent and prosecute sexual assault crimes, the complaints allege that these 
defendants created a culture tolerant of sexual violence and permissive of retal-
iatory responses to claims of sexual assault by service members.135 
                                                                                                                           
ligently or intentionally, in the scope of their authority in the military. See id. at 768–69, 782; Natel-
son, supra note 96, at 281. 
 133 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 517–18 (affirming the dismissal of a class action lawsuit brought by 
service members against Department of Defense officials); Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (dismissing 
intra-military service members’ class action against Department of Defense officials). 
 134 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506–07; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 10–11; Banner, supra note 6, at 732. 
The stories of Plaintiffs Kori Cioca and Ariana Klay provide a glimpse of the sexual assault and har-
assment thousands of military men and women face on a daily basis while serving in the armed forces. 
See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506–07, 513–14; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 10–11; Banner, supra note 6, at 
732–33, 738.  
 Kori Cioca was sexually harassed, physically assaulted and eventually raped by her direct super-
visor in the Coast Guard. See Banner, supra note 6, at 732–33. The physical assault dislocated her jaw 
and left her with permanent nerve damage in her face. See THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 126. Cio-
ca reported the assault to military command, but she did not receive a response. Banner, supra note 6, 
at 733. After multiple attacks, command transferred Cioca but warned her to drop her allegations of 
rape, threatening her with a court-martial. Id. Command required Cioca to sign a paper referring to the 
rape as an inappropriate consensual relationship with her direct supervisor. Id. She was eventually 
discharged from her post for reason of a “history of inappropriate relationships.” Id. Her discharge 
came two months before her two-year service obligation, thus disqualifying her from any veterans’ 
benefits. Id. Her attacker received no corrective action and is still stationed at the post where he at-
tacked Cioca. See id.; THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 126. 
 Ariana Klay was sexually harassed by numerous superior officers while stationed at the Marine 
Barracks in Washington, D.C., including a major, a captain, and a lieutenant colonel. See Banner, 
supra note 6, at 733. Klay was told to “deal with it” when she reported the verbal harassment to com-
mand. Id. The verbal assaults escalated, and in 2010 a senior officer and his civilian friend forcefully 
entered her residence and raped her. Id. After reporting the rape, she was told that her clothes and 
makeup suggested she likely welcomed the attack. Id. One of her rapists was court-martialed, but 
convicted only of the lesser crimes of adultery and indecent language—not rape. Id. One of her har-
assers was even promoted. Id. 
 135 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506–07; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 10–11; Banner, supra note 6, at 737–
38. These class actions asserted that in addition to the Fifth Amendment violations to bodily integrity, 
the inaction and retribution by military officials in response to reports of sexual assault impeded the 
plaintiffs’ due process rights and First Amendment rights, including unfair terminations, demotions, 
and other mistreatment. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506–07; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 10–11. Additionally, 
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The plaintiffs brought their claims as a Bivens cause of action, rather than 
under the FTCA.136 Because of the courts’ reliance on Feres to articulate a 
standard in a military Bivens claim, however, both class actions have suffered 
defeat at the hands of the Feres doctrine jurisprudence.137 Pointing to the “in-
cident to service” and deference to military discipline rationales of Feres, the 
district courts in both suits dismissed the claims for lack of justiciability, citing 
the unique disciplinary structure of the military as a “special factor” counseling 
against judicial intrusion.138 
As understood by the judges in the Klay and Cioca decisions—and others 
like them—lower courts’ hands are tied by the judicial exception to the waiver 
of sovereign immunity in intra-military claims, which began with Feres and 
has grown into broad deference for military decision making and discipline.139 
The reasonableness and validity of denying military service members recourse 
and relief in Article III courts is questionable, however, particularly when these 
very same crimes are undoubtedly justiciable for private citizens.140 Where 
military remedies have failed to adequately deter and compensate victims, 
lower courts and critics have advocated for a re-examination of the Feres doc-
                                                                                                                           
plaintiffs contended that their equal protection rights were violated. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506–07; 
Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 10–11; Banner, supra note 6, at 732. 
 136 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506–07; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 9–10. A Bivens claim is a judicially-
created action permitted against federal officials for violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. 
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) 
(imposing constitutional tort liability on government officers or employees in their personality capaci-
ty). Courts construe Bivens narrowly and only permit Bivens actions where Congress has not provided 
a cause of action and no special factors exist. See id.; see e.g., Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304; Cioca, 720 
F.3d at 508–10. 
 137 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516–18 (applying the Feres doctrine to bar the Bivens action); Klay, 
924 F. Supp. 2d at 18, 20 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that the court did not have juris-
diction under the principles of Feres). 
 138 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516–18 (concluding that it was beyond the court’s “judicial cogni-
zance” to determine whether a Bivens action would help or hinder military decision making and disci-
pline, and deeming Congress better suited to provide a statutory remedy as it deems necessary); Klay, 
924 F. Supp. 2d at 10, 12, 20 (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, citing the court’s lack of judi-
cial power to provide the recourse sought in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Feres). In 
Bivens, the Supreme Court explained that a legal remedy is not available when “special factors coun-
seling hesitation” exist. 403 U.S. at 396. At the time, the Court declined to articulate what these “spe-
cial factors” were. See id. In 1983, in Chappell v. Wallace, however, the Court clarified that the fac-
tors counseling hesitation were the same as the rationales articulated in the Feres doctrine. See Chap-
pell, 462 U.S. at 298. 
 139 See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516, 518; Ruggiero v. United States, 162 F. App’x 140, 143 (3d Cir. 
2006); Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
 140 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 992 (asserting that Feres began as a reasonable rule when it 
was designed to limit the government’s liability for accidental injuries to soldiers covered by military 
benefits, but now, the doctrine no longer appears reasonable in light of the claims it denies). 
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trine by the Supreme Court.141 The sentiment of one critic nearly twenty years 
ago rings true even more so today: “[the Feres doctrine] seems to say that the 
military has the power of life and death over its personnel, with no limit recog-
nized in the constitution or a tort claim. The courts cannot mean that the mili-
tary has such far-reaching authority.”142 
III. REVISITING FERES: THE NEED FOR A MORE SEARCHING JUDICIAL 
INQUIRY TO PROTECT A DISCRETE AND INSULAR MINORITY 
In light of multiple lower court decisions dismissing intra-military sexual 
assault claims while expressing disdain for the current state of the law, former 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s sentiment regarding the military and the justice 
system is particularly poignant: “[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped 
of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.”143 The 
Feres doctrine has divested victims of intra-military sexual assault of the right 
to hold their government accountable for the torts and constitutional violations 
committed against them, contrary to the plain language of Congress in the 
FTCA and the due process and equal protection rights afforded all citizens un-
der the constitution.144 The time is now for the Supreme Court to revisit its in-
terpretation of the FTCA—not only to bring its statutory construction in line 
with the statute’s plain text and congressional intent, but also to recognize the 
rights the doctrine has denied service members since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See id. at 992, 996–97 (noting that the necessary outcome of the Feres doctrine no longer 
appears reasonable because it sweeps too many valid tort claims under its bar without regard for 
whether another adequate intra-military remedy exists to compensate a legitimate claim). 
 142 See id. at 992. 
 143 See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962); see, 
e.g., Ruggiero v. United States, 162 F. App’x 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We have no choice but to 
apply Feres to the instant case, despite the harshness of the result and our concern about the doctrine’s 
analytical foundations.”); Bowers v. United States, 904 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that 
“perhaps a remedy ought to be available” but noting that the decision to provide relief was for Con-
gress or the Supreme Court); see also Banner, supra note 6, at 729 (arguing that, despite Chief Justice 
Earl Warren’s cautioning, this is exactly what is happening to victims of military sexual assault); 
Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 133 (2002) (observing the 
“striking discontinuity in the duty of our servicemembers to defend liberties and rights with which 
they are only partially vested”). 
 144 See Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 869–71 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the Feres doctrine has created a classification that runs afoul of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments by effectively declaring that military service mem-
bers’ rights against their government are less than the rights of their fellow Americans); Hollywood, 
supra note 125, at 190–92 (highlighting the arguments advanced against the Feres doctrine by the 
dissent in Costo, including the Court’s unconstitutional re-writing of an unambiguous and constitu-
tional statute); Liljegren, supra note 89, at 203 (arguing that the Feres doctrine should be ruled uncon-
stitutional because it denies members of the armed forces the ability to bring a civil claim against 
anyone for sexual harassment while on active duty). 
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1950 decision in Feres v. United States.145 In the context of intra-military sex-
ual assault specifically, Feres removes all of the civil protections and remedies 
against sexual assault and harassment afforded to their civilian counterparts.146 
Section A of this Part argues that the Court should reconsider the Feres 
doctrine because it is inconsistent with the text and legislative intent of the 
FTCA.147 Section A further contends that the Court’s reliance on judicial ab-
stention where matters of military decision making and discipline are at issue 
is misplaced in the context of intra-military sexual assault; rather, judicial re-
view is necessary to ensure the constitutional rights of military victims are not 
read out of the FTCA.148 Section B of this Part proposes that the Court should 
overturn Feres and limit the combatant activities exception to an objective 
analysis focusing on whether an activity is truly combative in nature.149 The 
Court should not shy away from intra-military sexual assault claims, particu-
larly because the constitution demands oversight of military decision making 
and discipline when it denies citizens in uniform of their constitutional 
rights.150 
A. Certiorari Granted: Judicial Review of the Feres Doctrine 
“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of 
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”151 In 
fulfilling its mission to explain the law, the Supreme Court, on occasion, inevi-
tably declares the law to be what it is not.152 Though the fallacy may not be-
come apparent until many years and decisions later, stare decisis does not re-
quire the Court to remain tethered to a decision—like Feres—that is manifest-
ly absurd or unjust.153 As argued in Subsection 1 of this Part, the Court’s statu-
                                                                                                                           
 145 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); see Lanus v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2731, 2732 (2013) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Costo, 248 
F.3d at 869–71 (Ferguson, J., dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 103, at 461; Hollywood, supra 
note 125, at 190–92. 
 146 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 992, 996–97; Liljegren, supra note 89, at 201–03. 
 147 See infra notes 151–167 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 168–180 and accompanying text. 
 149 See infra notes 181–189 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 151–189 and accompanying text. 
 151 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). 
 152 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 783, 797 (2009) (overturning Michigan v. Jack-
son, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), to avoid adopting an unworkable standard or forcing lower courts to make 
“arbitrary and anomalous distinctions”); Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (noting that unworkability is a ra-
tionale for changing a legal standard). 
 153 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69–70 (“For if it be found that the former 
decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it 
was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm as has been erroneously deter-
mined.”); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 477 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. 1989) (12th ed. 1873) (observing that courts “are replete with hasty and crude deci-
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tory interpretation of the FTCA in 1950 was erroneous insofar as it granted 
broad sovereign immunity for combatant activities far beyond what Congress 
prescribed in the statute and requires re-examination.154 Moreover, as Subsec-
tion 2 of this Part further argues, the circumstances in which the Feres doctrine 
is being applied to preclude a civil remedy fall within the categorical realm of 
mandatory judicial review set forth in United States v. Carolene Products.155 
1. The Supreme Court Must Re-Examine the FTCA 
The text and legislative history of the FTCA do not suggest Congress in-
tended to create a dichotomy between private citizens and military service 
members when providing a tort remedy against the government for the ill ef-
fects of sovereign immunity.156 Rather, the legislative history reveals that Con-
gress specifically considered this kind of line drawing and ultimately decided 
against creating a total bar for the armed forces, instead limiting the grant of 
sovereign immunity to injuries arising out of the “combatant activities” of the 
military.157 Nevertheless, the Court in Feres and subsequent Feres doctrine 
cases read beyond the text of the statute in order to conform its interpretation 
of the FTCA to general principles of judicial abstention and corresponding mil-
itary deference.158 Although Feres may have made sense from a policy per-
spective in 1950, the doctrine’s lack of statutory support explains the problem-
                                                                                                                           
sions; and such cases ought to be examined without fear, and revised without reluctance, rather than to 
have the character of our law impaired, and the beauty and harmony of the system destroyed by the 
perpetuity of error”). 
 154 See infra notes 156–167 and accompanying text. 
 155 See infra notes 168–180 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “[r]ead as it is written, [the] 
language [of the FTCA] renders the United States liable to all persons, including servicemen, injured 
by the negligence of Government employees”); Froelich, supra note 9, at 710–11 (arguing that Con-
gress considered provisions for significantly limiting the government’s liability in military tort suits 
but determined sovereign immunity should only apply to a narrow subset of military activity—
namely, combatant activities). 
 157 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 693–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the legislative history 
“demonstrat[es] that Congress specifically considered, and provided what it thought needful for, the 
special requirements of the military. There was no proper basis for [the Court] to supplement—i.e., 
revise—that congressional disposition”); see also supra note 35 (detailing the legislative history of the 
FTCA); supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that of the eighteen tort claims bills introduced in 
Congress between 1925 and 1935, all but two contained explicit provisions denying recovery to members 
of the military). 
 158 See Costo, 248 F.3d at 873 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Feres evaluated the FTCA 
rather than clarifying it, and because the Court “simply did not agree with Congress,” it “searched in 
puzzling ways to declare that military personnel are not equal to civilians”); Banner, supra note 6, at 
725–26 (describing one of the substantial obstacles for victims of intra-military sexual assault is the 
“specter of ‘judicial activism’ and its mirror, ‘military deference,’ the reluctance of the judiciary to 
usurp Congressional responsibility for the conduct of military affairs”). 
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atic nature of the decisions it produces today, particularly in light of different 
facts and a different social and legal landscape.159 
When drafting the thirteen explicit exceptions to the FTCA’s broad waiver 
of sovereign immunity, Congress strived to create a workable statute to remedy 
the individual injustices of the government’s immunity from suit.160 The Su-
preme Court complicated these categorical exceptions in Feres by reading into 
the combatant activities exception an expansive definition of “combatant” not 
intended by Congress.161 As a result, nearly any act undertaken or suffered by 
military service members falls outside the purview of Article III courts under 
the FTCA.162 
In the context of intra-military sexual assault, the Court’s current statutory 
interpretation reduces the brutal crimes of rape and sexual assault to one of 
many activities “incident to service” of one’s country as a member of the U.S. 
Military.163 This inconsistent legal reality alone should prompt the Court to 
rethink its broad interpretation of the FTCA.164 Significantly, the primary con-
cern underlying the “incident to service” test is the Court’s aversion to prying 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Costo, 248 F.3d at 870 n.1 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the inequity of the 
Feres doctrine is readily apparent in situations where courts have applied Feres to “bar claims arising 
from non-combatant activities engaged in during times of peace”); Banner, supra note 6, at 727–29; 
Hollywood, supra note 125, at 188–89 (noting that the Feres doctrine today rests on the “shaky mili-
tary discipline rationale”); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 992, 996–97. 
 160 See Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) (noting that Congress decided it 
would be unfair for an individual to bear the burden of the government’s negligence, and arguing that 
there is no justification for the Court to read exemptions beyond those set forth in the FTCA). 
 161 See Banner, supra note 6, at 749–50 (noting the expansive interpretations of Feres); see, e.g., 
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the con-
duct at issue was “so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot 
be considered a part of the military mission). 
 162 See Costo, 248 F.3d at 871–72 (asserting that Feres took “a fairly small, clearly defined, legis-
latively-created classification and broadened it considerably”); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 996–97 
(noting the problematic result of the Feres doctrine’s sweeping reach). 
 163 See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 516–18 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying the Feres doctrine to 
bar claims arising out of intra-military sexual assault); Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 
(D.D.C. 2013) (same); Banner, supra note 6, at 730 (arguing that Feres has been extended to “the 
point of unrecognizability”); Hollywood, supra note 125, at 188–89 (noting that in the majority of 
cases there is a “tight enough fit” between the circumstances surrounding the injury and the military 
discipline rationale, forcing courts to apply Feres to bar service members’ claims). 
 164 See Banner, supra note 6, at 759 (maintaining that when the Feres doctrine bars intra-military 
sexual assault claims, “neither the legislative intent in passing the FTCA nor the intuitively, morally 
correct idea . . . that the little guy should be protected from immoral conduct, is being realized”); see 
also Payne, 501 U.S. at 829–30 (noting that reconsideration may be necessary where a decision has 
“been questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions” and has “defied consistent application 
by the lower courts”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 153, at *69–70 (noting that decisions that are “mani-
festly absurd or unjust” should not be maintained). 
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into military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.165 
Yet military discipline and effectiveness have been compromised because of 
the sexual assault crises, both internally and in the eyes of an otherwise re-
specting American public.166 Where the Feres doctrine’s rationale no longer 
achieves its purpose and lacks any support in the statutory language, the Court 
should give pause when allowing the perpetuation of a decision that has taken 
on a life of its own, wholly separated from the text from which it originates.167 
2. Violations of Service Members’ Constitutional Rights at the Hands of the 
Feres Doctrine Demand Judicial Review 
In addition to re-examining the Feres doctrine to better comport with the 
statutory language and intent of the FTCA, the Supreme Court should also 
consider Feres’ effect on intra-military sexual assault claims and the rights of 
service members.168 The Supreme Court should not abandon its vital role in 
American democracy as a protector of “discrete and insular minorities.”169 
This duty is imperative where, like here, political processes have failed to pro-
vide adequate legal protections, leaving thousands of military men and women 
without recourse or remedy for crimes committed against them that would oth-
erwise be redressed in civilian courts.170 The risk of infringing on military dis-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See, e.g., Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691 (“Suits brought by service members against the Govern-
ment for service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and 
thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word.”). 
 166 See Banner, supra note 6, at 729 (noting the significant “threat of erosion of the military 
command structure if sexual violence is permitted to continue unabated”); Zyznar, supra note 34, at 
621–22 (arguing that “military order and efficiency is undermined when the federal government shirks 
legal accountability for its negligent conduct”); see also Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 778 
(7th Cir. 1999) (“Tolerance of [intra-military sexual assault] results in a warping of military discipline, 
a lack of military readiness, and a weakening of national security. Democratic support for military 
institutions [erodes] when citizens do not believe that their children . . . will be treated with dignity 
and respect during their period of service.”). 
 167 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700, 702–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Costo, 248 F.3d at 876 (Fergu-
son, J., dissenting) (arguing that “blind adherence” to the unworkable “incident to service” require-
ment is intolerable and the Supreme Court must revisit the Feres doctrine to prevent further constitu-
tional and statutory violations). 
 168 See Chemerinsky, supra note 103, at 459 (noting that a “more searching judicial inquiry” is 
appropriate when it is a law that interferes with individual rights, a law that restricts the ability of the 
political process to repeal undesirable legislation, or a law that discriminates against a “discrete and 
insular minority”). 
 169 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (proposing a new 
standard of judicial review for claims involving “discrete and insular minorities” not adequately pro-
tected by the political processes); see Banner, supra note 6, at 726 (arguing that “blind application of 
outdated caselaw in [intra-military sexual assault cases under Feres and Bivens] is legally and morally 
unsound”). 
 170 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4; Costo, 248 F.3d at 869–71, 876 (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting); Holley Lynn James Act, H.R. 1517, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011) (seeking, unsuccessfully, to 
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cipline and decision making should not deny legal protections to military ser-
vicemen and women.171 
The constitutional crisis springing from the Feres doctrine demands a 
“more searching judicial inquiry,” as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
United States v. Carolene Products in 1938.172 The Feres doctrine is responsi-
ble for the misguided reality that members of the military—although citizens 
for purposes of protecting the United States from foreign enemies—do not en-
joy equal protection against the very government they defend.173 Allowing 
sovereign immunity to trump civil liability in intra-military sexual assault cas-
es denies injured military personnel the redress they would otherwise enjoy as 
civilians.174 Moreover, prioritizing immunity results in a system that fails to 
hold accountable individual perpetrators and the military institutions that 
shield them.175 
The Supreme Court maintains that this is a matter for the political branch-
es to resolve because they are better suited to deal with matters pertaining to 
the special relationship between soldiers and superiors.176 Yet the Court has 
                                                                                                                           
amend the FTCA to explicitly allow claims by members of the armed forces against the United States 
for certain injuries relating to or arising out of sexual assault or domestic violence); Chemerinsky, 
supra note 103, at 459–60 (arguing that the Court must step in when a law restricts the ability of the 
political process to repeal undesirable legislation). 
 171 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the effect on military 
discipline is not so certain or substantial as to justify such a broad interpretation of Feres to bar ser-
vice member suits); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (reasoning that the failure to 
provide any tort recovery to prisoners would be more prejudicial than the application of non-uniform 
state tort laws). 
 172 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (indicating that “a more searching judicial in-
quiry” is necessary in cases where “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities”); Banner, supra note 6, at 729 (arguing that “in the case of serious, 
widespread, and unremedied constitutional violations, the biggest threat to democracy is not judicial 
intervention but judicial complacency”). 
 173 See Costo, 248 F.3d at 870 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (holding that the Feres doctrine “effec-
tively declares that the members of the United States military are not equal citizens, as their rights 
against their government are less than the rights of their fellow Americans”); Turley, supra note 143, 
at 3 (noting that service members “hold a type of dual citizenship: citizens of both the national repub-
lic . . . and a pocket republic that supplants many of [our democratic] principles with an endogenous 
system of rules and traditions”). 
 174 See Natelson, supra note 96, at 281 (stating that unlike civilians, military harassment victims 
have “virtually no avenue for relief when their employer fails to take appropriate corrective action in 
response to complaints”); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 992, 996–97 (noting that the Feres doctrine 
“sweeps too many qualitatively distinct tort claims under its bar without regard for the actual adequa-
cy of intramilitary remedies to resolve a particular claim”). 
 175 See Natelson, supra note 96, at 281 (arguing that institutional immunity precludes outside 
judicial review that could function as a real deterrent in the battle against intra-military sexual assault 
and harassment). 
 176 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983) (stating that “[i]t is clear that the Con-
stitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch has plenary control over rights, duties, and respon-
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also recognized that the protections of the political process do not always reach 
discrete and insular minorities, and the Court must, therefore, intervene.177 In 
cases of intra-military sexual assault, the Court undoubtedly possesses the ca-
pacity to intervene, and it must do so.178 
In his dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 denial of certiorari in 
Lanus v. United States, Justice Clarence Thomas’s succinct call for judicial re-
consideration of Feres and the doctrine’s impact on service members reflects 
mounting concern over the “troubling” and “egregious” consequence of the 
Court’s jurisprudence in denying the legal rights of soldiers.179 Whereas the 
Court should generally presume laws are constitutional, because of the Court’s 
problematic re-writing of the FTCA, the Feres doctrine requires an intensive 
judicial review.180 
B. Overturning Feres: Removing the Judge-Made Ambiguity from an 
Intentionally Unambiguous Statute 
With the clarity of hindsight, the Court should overturn its statutory inter-
pretation in Feres and adopt a narrow construction of the combatant activities 
exception that limits sovereign immunity to only those injuries arising out of 
the act of engaging in or preparing for combat as understood in the context of 
the military mission at the time.181 A circumscribed approach to the exception, 
grounded in a common-sense understanding of the term “combatant,” would 
                                                                                                                           
sibilities in the framework of the military establishment, including regulations, procedures and reme-
dies related to military discipline; and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity with that 
view”); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (holding that the “peculiar and special 
relationship of the soldier to his superiors” counsels against judicial intervention). 
 177 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (holding that the Court must intervene where the 
rights of discrete and insular minorities are not protected by a statute as applied); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 103, at 458–60 (noting that judicial review is necessary where a law interferes with individual 
rights or discriminates against a “discrete and insular minority”). 
 178 See Chemerinsky, supra note 103, at 458–60 (arguing that judicial review is justified because 
insular minority groups, such as military service members, cannot trust the other branches of govern-
ment to protect their rights). 
 179 See Lanus, 133 S. Ct. at 2731 (arguing that Feres was wrongly decided and stating that “at a 
bare minimum, it should be reconsidered”); Cioca, 720 F.3d at 508, 514, 517–18 (dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ complaint while characterizing the claims as “egregious” and “troubling”); Ruggiero, 162 
F. App’x at 143 (“We have no choice but to apply Feres to the instant case, despite the harshness of 
the result and our concern about the doctrine’s analytical foundations.”). 
 180 See Chemerinsky, supra note 103, at 459 (stating that courts should generally presume laws 
are constitutional, but a “more searching judicial inquiry” becomes necessary when a law interferes 
with individual rights or restricts the ability of the political process to repeal bad legislation). 
 181 See Lanus, 133 S. Ct. at 2732 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Costo, 248 F.3d at 876 (Ferguson, J., dissenting); Zyznar, supra note 34, at 628. 
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not only comport with the text of the FTCA but would also reflect Congress’s 
intent.182 
Moreover, a narrowed interpretation of the FTCA’s combatant activities 
exception would prevent the current bar to intra-military sexual assault claims, 
which have no logical connection to combatant activities.183 In the 2013 hold-
ing in Cioca v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, in reference to the 
alleged Bivens action, “Congress has never created an express cause of action 
as a remedy for the type of claim that Plaintiffs allege here.”184 To the contrary, 
Congress has provided a remedy for victims of intra-military sexual assault 
through the FTCA, but it is the judiciary that has denied this remedy to mili-
tary victims.185 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See 92 CONG. REC. 10,093 (1946) (revealing that the descriptor “combatant” was proposed as 
an amendment to the exception prior to the passage of the FTCA and adopted without discussion); 
Gottlieb, supra note 36, at 50–53 (arguing that the term “combatant” was intended as a clarification of 
the FTCA provision rather than a “radical departure from the obvious purpose of the exception”); 
Astley, supra note 25, at 195–96 (asserting that legislative intent to narrow the combatant activities 
exception is evidenced by debate on an earlier version of the FTCA, in which a member of Congress 
stated immunity was waived except for the specifically enumerated exceptions in the bill (citing 86 
CONG. REC. 12,019 (1940) (statement of Rep. Celler)). Writing immediately after the enactment of the 
FTCA, one scholar relied on the definition of the word “combatant,” the legislative history of the Act, 
and an assessment of the military conditions at the time the FTCA was approved by Congress to de-
vise a reasonable construction of the exception. Gottlieb, supra note 36, at 50–53. Specifically, he 
opined: 
[The combatant activities exception] was intended to exclude from the operation of the 
Act, after December 8, 1941 and until the cessation of actual hostilities all claims, oth-
erwise cognizable hereunder, which arose out of the actual training operations in the 
United States, its territories and possessions of all personnel of the armed forces being 
prepared for combat activity. Such a definition, of course, is not completely self-
executing, and would be determined upon the facts of each case as it may arise. Such 
construction gives “hospitable scope” to the expressed desire of Congress to immunize 
from threat of damage suits certain activities of the United States which should in their 
very nature operate unhampered. Conversely, it would appear that after cessation of 
hostilities, or in the time of peace, all negligent acts of the military or naval forces, or 
the Coast Guard, causing injury or death or property damage would be cognizable un-
der this Act. 
Id. at 52–53. Additional commentary on the FTCA immediately after its passage noted that the term 
“combatant activity” was narrowly construed in Army Regulations and decisions by the Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army. See Comment, supra note 35, at 549. Specifically, the commentary noted 
that the use of “combatant activity” in other military contexts even excluded activities reasonably 
understood to relate to combat, such as practice and training maneuvers and operations not directly 
connected to engaging the enemy. See id. 
 183 See Banner, supra note 6, at 732, 759; Reidy, supra note 91, at 636–37, 665–66. 
 184 See 720 F.3d at 517. 
 185 See Banner, supra note 6, at 732, 759; Reidy, supra note 91, at 636–37, 665–66. 
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By overturning the Feres doctrine, the Court would undo the artificial 
ambiguity for an otherwise unambiguous statute.186 Even without the clarity of 
hindsight, the text and legislative history of the FTCA provide a clear roadmap 
for the Court to interpret the combatant activities exception narrowly and 
pragmatically.187 Military service members should not have to consent to sexu-
al assault as one of the many consequences of military service.188 The Court 
must conform its interpretation of the combatant activities exception to avoid 
the categorical treatment of intra-military sexual assault claims as merely “in-
cident to service.”189 
CONCLUSION 
The Court is long overdue in its re-examination of the Feres doctrine. In 
light of the sexual assault crisis permeating the military and the absence of an 
adequate civil remedy for military victims, the Court must closely review its 
interpretation of the FTCA in Feres as well as critically examine the Feres 
doctrine’s subsequent rationales. The Court would be amiss to rely on judicial 
abstention as a justification for dismissing military personnel’s claims for relief 
under the FTCA, particularly where the text and legislative intent of the statute 
provide a cause of action. Most significantly, however, the Court is faced with 
a constitutional crisis of judicial review and must take up its proper role as pro-
tector of discrete and insular minorities, where the rights of military victims of 
sexual assault have been effectively written out of the FTCA. 
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 186 See Costo, 248 F.3d at 871, 876 (arguing that the Feres doctrine is a “judicial re-writing of an 
unambiguous and constitutional statute” and noting that “[i]t is time for the Supreme Court” to revisit 
its decision). 
 187 See Gottlieb, supra note 36, at 50–53 (interpreting the “combatant activities” exception as 
excluding only those negligent acts that arise out of actual hostilities or training operations in prepara-
tion for combat activity, and permitting all other negligent acts of the military causing injury or death). 
 188 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 709 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the non-consensual ad-
ministrative of psychotropic drugs was “so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter 
of law it simply [could not] be considered part of the military mission”); Banner, supra note 6, at 729–
30; Natelson, supra note 96, at 281; Reidy, supra note 91, at 636–37, 665–66. 
 189 See Costo, 248 F.3d at 871, 876; Banner, supra note 6, at 729–30. 
